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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
ESSAYS ON MACROECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF DEVELOPMENT
by
Nazmul Islam
Florida International University, 2019
Miami, Florida
Professor Mihaela I. Pintea, Major Professor
This dissertation includes three essays on empirical studies of macroeconomic
analysis of development. The first and second chapter focus on defining different
categories of households based on the type of wealth they hold, deriving their
demographic characteristics and how they react to transitory income shocks. The
economics literature splits households into poor hand-to-mouth (P-HtM), wealthy handto-mouth (W-HtM), and not hand-to-mouth (N-HtM). This breakdown is important to
accurately capture how different categories of households react to income shocks.
In Chapter 1, I argue that this classification is missing important features related
to the behavior of indebted households. Thus, novel in the literature, I define a new
category of households: the indebted poor hand-to-mouth (IP-HtM), those that hold no
net liquid assets (cash, checking, savings accounts etc.) and are indebted in illiquid
wealth (negative net value of illiquid wealth defined as a negative net mortgage value that
is not offset by positive illiquid assets such as private retirement accounts). I identify the
share of such households in the United States, their demographic characteristics, their
portfolio composition, and the persistence of their status over their life cycle. In the
literature, they assimilate into the P-HtM households that hold neither net liquid nor net

vi

illiquid assets. However, I show that the age profile of IP-HtM households by
demographic characteristics demonstrates almost the same pattern as W-HtM households
that do not hold liquid assets but own sizable amounts of illiquid wealth.
In the second chapter, I perform a detailed analysis of how various items of
consumption such as food, nonfood, durable, nondurable, social sector, healthcare,
utilities and education expenditure respond to transitory income shocks. The IP-HtM
exhibits the highest marginal propensity to consume among all categories of households,
for most consumption items. This implies that the stimulatory government’s policies are
the most effective for the IP-HtMs. This research can help governments design and
execute their fiscal policies targeting the highest stimulatory effect during recessions.
In the third chapter, I use a 2013 survey of rickshaw pullers in Dhaka,
Bangladesh to identify the determinants of their households’ healthcare expenditure using
a flexible Box-Cox model regression method. The results suggest that income, distance of
residence from healthcare center/hospital, age of household head, and duration of illness
episode are the main determinants of healthcare utilization. The income elasticity of
about 0.55 signals the tendency for healthcare to behave like a normal and necessary
good. Since healthcare is a necessity in the “basic needs” theory of economic
development, the way healthcare expenditure in a resource-constrained community
responds to changes in income level and other factors is particularly relevant to
development policy. Working-class populations in developing countries have unmet
healthcare needs, and effective policies and programs are needed to ensure that healthcare
services are received in a timely manner.
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INTRODUCTION
This dissertation is comprised of three distinct yet related essays. All three essays
are focused on empirical studies of macroeconomic analysis of development. In
particular, I focus on the analysis of different characteristics of resource constrained
households and how they react to various economic shocks. In the first two essays, I use
data from the United States households for defining different groups of resource
constrained households on the basis of the type of wealth they hold, deriving their
demographic characteristics and their consumption reaction to transitory income shocks.
In the third essay, I use a survey of a resource constrained community from a developing
country, Bangladesh, to determine the factors that affect their households’ healthcare
expenditure.
In the first essay, I define a new category of households, the indebted poor handto-mouth (IP-HtM), and analyze its characteristics in relation to other types of
households. Currently, the economics literature splits households into different categories
depending on the type of wealth they hold (Kaplan & Violante, 2010; Kaplan, Violante,
& Weidner, 2014). The categories of wealth under consideration are net liquid wealth,
which is the difference between liquid assets (checking and savings accounts, stocks,
bonds, etc.) and liquid debts (student loans, credit cards, etc.) and net illiquid wealth (net
value of mortgages, private retirement accounts, etc.). According to this classification,
hand-to-mouth (HtM) households are split into poor hand-to-mouth (P-HtM), those that
hold little or no liquid wealth and no illiquid wealth; wealthy hand-to-mouth (W-HtM),
those that hold no liquid wealth but sizable amounts of illiquid wealth; and not hand-to-
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mouth (N-HtM), those that hold both liquid and illiquid wealth. This breakdown is
important to accurately capture how different categories of households react to income
shocks.
I argue that this classification is missing important features related to the behavior
of indebted households and further split the P-HtM households into two different
subcategories that lack definition and separate analysis in the economics literature. First, I
define indebted poor hand-to-mouth (IP-HtM) as the group of households that hold
negative net illiquid wealth. Second, I define not indebted poor hand-to-mouth (NIPHtM) as those households that do not hold any illiquid wealth. Using the Survey of
Consumer Finances (SCF) and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) data, I find
that about 0.6 percent to 1.4 percent of total households (more than 3 million people) in
the United States are IP-HtM and have debts in illiquid wealth (negative net illiquid
wealth). This number increases to about 3 percent during the Great Recession of 20082009, followed by a decrease during the recovery period. In addition, on average about 6
percent of the P-HtM households are IP-HtM, and the rest are NIP-HtM. Moreover, in the
PSID data, the maximum share of IP-HtM households is White with a geographical
concentration in the southern portion of the United States.
I show that the age profile of IP-HtMs by demographic characteristics exhibits
almost the same pattern as W-HtM. This suggests that one cannot assimilate IP-HtM
households into the P-HtM group. However, this group does not fit into the category of
W-HtM households either since the portfolio composition of the indebted household is
dissimilar to that of the W-HtM. Therefore, IP-HtM households warrant their own
distinct status and behavior analysis in the literature.

2

If the first essay focused on the definition and description of the demographic
characteristics of IP-HtM, the second essay focuses on the analysis of the behavior of
these households. In the second essay, I describe how total consumption and different
items of consumption such as food, nonfood, durable and nondurable goods of IP-HtM
households react to a transitory income change. Moreover, I discuss the marginal
propensity to consume (MPC) for the social sector, healthcare, education, and utilities,
which are different components of nonfood items. I use a longitudinal data set that
includes information on income, consumption, and liquid and illiquid wealth at the
household level that is necessary to estimate the MPCs. I use the 9 waves of pooled data
(1999–2015) from the PSID survey on the United States household portfolios.
Using the methodology proposed by Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2008),
Kaplan and Violante (2010), and Kaplan et al. (2014), I estimate the consumption
response to transitory changes in income. Unlike these studies, I use the updated sample
periods with enriched data, estimate the transmission coefficients of income shocks to
consumption for IP-HtM households, and find the MPCs separately for other types of
HtM households. These two empirical analyses differentiate this study from Blundell et
al. (2008) and Kaplan et al. (2014).
In data, results show that in the baseline specification, MPC of the total
consumption for the IP-HtM households is 0.97. However, it is 0.42, 0.23, 0.48, 0.71, and
0.62 for nondurable, durable, nonfood, food, and utilities, respectively. In comparing
these results to the responses of P-HtM, NIP-HtM, and W-HtM households, I find that
the consumption of IP-HtM households is the most responsive (highest MPC) for all
consumption items except durables, health care, and social sector expenditure in the
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baseline specification. This suggests that the government can obtain the maximum
effectiveness of its stimulatory policies for the IP-HtM households. This study can help
government design and execute the fiscal policies directing the highest stimulatory effect
during economic slowdown.
In the third essay, I investigate the determinants of healthcare expenditure of a
resource-constrained community using flexible Box-Cox model regression methods and
cross-sectional micro-level household data. Resource-constrained households like those
of working-class population live from hand to mouth, and they spend a large share of
their earnings on their basic needs. They do not have enough money to pay for the
necessary healthcare services. They might decrease their healthcare spending if there is
any rise in out-of-pocket payment on healthcare expenditures, and even small
copayments might reduce the possibility of receiving required healthcare. Healthcare
providers can provide services more effectively to such low-income households, like
those of day labors, if they know the factors of healthcare spending among this group of
households.
For this study, I use a 2013 survey of rickshaw pullers (RP) in Dhaka,
Bangladesh. Considering their poor social and economic status, type of service to the
economy, lack of access to high-quality healthcare, lack of human and physical capital,
and so on, RP represent a resource-constrained community in a developing country.
I find that income, distance of residence from healthcare center/hospital, age of
household head, and duration of illness episode are the significant factors of healthcare
utilization for a resource-constrained community. The healthcare income elasticity of
about 0.55 implies that healthcare is like a normal and necessary good. How healthcare
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expenditure in this community reacts to changes in income level and other determinants
is also relevant to health policy because healthcare is a necessity in the “basic needs”
theory of economic development. This group of populations in developing countries have
unmet healthcare needs. This study discusses the implications for sustainable basic
healthcare development policies for the marginalized households in society.
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CHAPTER 1
THE INDEBTED HAND-TO-MOUTH
1.1 Introduction
The economics literature splits households into different categories depending on
the type of wealth they hold (Kaplan & Violante 2010; Kaplan, Violante, & Weidner
2014). The categories of wealth under consideration are net liquid wealth, which is the
difference between liquid assets (checking and savings accounts, stocks, bonds etc.) and
liquid debts (student loans, credit cards etc.) and net illiquid wealth (net value of
mortgages, private retirement accounts etc.). According to this classification, hand-tomouth (HtM) households are split into poor hand-to-mouth (P-HtM), those that hold little
or no liquid wealth and no illiquid wealth, wealthy hand-to-mouth (W-HtM) those that
hold no liquid wealth but sizable amounts of illiquid wealth, and not hand-to-mouth (NHtM) households, those that hold both liquid and illiquid wealth. This breakdown is
important to accurately capture how different categories of households react to income
shocks.
I argue that this classification is missing important features related to the behavior
of indebted households and further split the P-HtM households into two different
subcategories that lack definition and separate analysis in the economics literature. First, I
define indebted poor hand-to-mouth (IP-HtM) as the group of households that hold
negative net illiquid wealth.1 Second, I define not indebted poor hand-to-mouth (NIPHtM) as those households that do not hold any illiquid wealth.

1

Gerardi, Herkenhoff, Ohanian, and Willen (2018) show that focusing on housing as the main illiquid
assets, contrary to what standard models of strategic default would imply, nearly all very low equity
borrowers remain current on their payments, and therefore preserve their illiquid assets. This finding
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I find that in terms of demographic characteristics, IP-HtMs are more similar to
W-HtM than to P-HtM households, the category into which they currently fall in the
literature. This suggests that one cannot integrate IP-HtM households into the P-HtM
group. On the other hand, this group does not fit into the category of W-HtM households
since the portfolio composition of the indebted household is quite different from that of
the W-HtM. Therefore, it makes more sense not to integrate the IP-HtM households into
either the P-HtM or the W-HtM households; rather, IP-HtM households deserve their
own separate status and behavior analysis in the literature.
I compiled pooled information from the Household Dataset for the period of
1989-2016 at the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) during the course of my research
from 2016 through 2018. During that same period, I collected pooled data from the
Household and Individual Dataset for the period of 1999-2015 at the Panel Study of
Income Dynamics (PSID). I used the SCF 10 waves of pooled data (1989–2016) of the
United States to document the share of IP-HtM households and analyze demographic
characteristics, and the portfolio composition of IP-HtM households. I used the 9 waves
of pooled data (1999–2015) from the PSID to observe the share of IP-HtM on the basis of
race and geographical location, and the persistence of IP-HtM status over household life
cycle.
Using the SCF and the PSID data, I find that about 0.6 percent to 1.4 percent of
total households (more than 3 million people) in the United States are IP-HtM, and have
debts in illiquid wealth (negative net illiquid wealth). This number increases to about 3

includes about 80 percent of households that need to cut their consumption to subsistence levels to make
their mortgage payments.
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percent during the Great Recession of 2008-2009, followed by a decrease during
recovery. In addition, on average about 6 percent of the P-HtM households are IP-HtM
and the rest are NIP-HtM. Moreover, in the PSID data, the maximum share of IP-HtM
households is White with a geographical concentration in the southern portion of the
United States.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: section two presents the
literature review, section three discusses the selected the sample and identifies IP-HtM
households in the data, section four identifies the share of IP-HtM households in the
United States data, section five explores demographics and portfolio composition of IPHtM, section six shows the share of IP-HtM households based on race and regions in
PSID Data, section seven describes the status persistence of IP-HtM households, and the
final section concludes.
1.2 Literature Review
Campbell and Mankiw (1989), Huggett (1996), Aiyagari (1994), Ríos-Rull
(1995), and Krusell and Smith (1998) used data on net worth to determine HtM behavior.
Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2015), Eggertson and Krugman (2012), and Gali,
Lopez-Salido, and Valles (2007), among others, used this type of model to study
macroeconomic dynamics around the Great Recession.
Kaplan et al. (2014) claimed that using data on net worth to estimate HtM
behavior is misleading as this oversights what they call the W-HtM households, that is,
households that have significant amounts of net worth or positive assets, but in an illiquid
form. This is also supported by Cui and Feng (2017). They documented that nearly 17
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percent of households in China are HtM, among them 10 percent are P-HtM and 90
percent are W-HtM. They also claimed that HtM in China mostly consist of the W-HtM,
who would be ignored by the traditional net worth measure.
A two-asset model (liquid asset and illiquid asset) developed by Kaplan et al.
(2014) instead of using net worth to characterize a more complex dimension of HtM
behavior. The illiquid asset pays a higher interest rate, but requires a transaction cost for
access. Two-asset models were also used by Angeletos, Laibson, Repetto, Tobacman, and
Weinberg (2001), Laibson, Repetto, and Tobacman (2003), Chetty and Szeidl (2007),
Alvarez, Guiso, and Lippi (2012), Huntley and Michelangeli (2014), and Kaplan and
Violante (2014a, 2014b).
Within the scope of this two-asset model, Kaplan et al. (2014) identified the NHtM as those households that have positive liquid assets and two other types of HtM
households. The P-HtM households have little or no liquid wealth and no illiquid wealth.
The W-HtM counterparts also have little or no liquid wealth; however, they hold
substantial volumes of illiquid assets. Even though W-HtM have positive assets and thus
a positive net worth that makes them similar to N-HtM, they have a high MPC and lack
the ability to exercise consumption smoothing similar to the P-HtM households.
Therefore, Kaplan et al. (2014) argued that it is impossible to completely integrate WHtM into either group and that W-HtM requires identification as a separate category of
households for the purpose of economic analysis. They used the SCF and PSID for
United States household data to identify the different types of HtM households. Their
estimates indicate that, on average, 31 percent of United States households are HtM. Of
these, approximately 10 percent are P-HtM and the rest are W-HtM. They found the
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similarity among the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada in their overall
share of HtM households and the breakdown between P-HtM and W-HtM. Among the
euro area countries, the fraction of HtM in Germany is closer to 30 percent; however,
France, Italy, and Spain have around 20 percent of HtM households. On the other hand,
the total share of HtM in Australia is roughly half the fraction in the United States, the
United Kingdom, and Canada. Also, 90 percent of Australia’s HtM households are WHtM. All the eight countries in their study, there are more W-HtM than P-HtM
households. This share exceeds two third for the euro area countries.
Park (2017) found that the shares of N-HtM, W-HtM, and P-HtM households are
64.0 percent, 32.2 percent, and 3.8 percent respectively in South Korea. Hara, Unayama,
and Weidner (2016) documented HtM households and studied their characteristics in
Japanese data. They showed that the share of HtM is about 13 percent, which is much
smaller than other developed countries and nearly one-quarter of them are considered as
P-HtM and rest of them are W-HtM.
1.3 Data and Methodology
I use the method developed by Kaplan et al. (2014) to identify the different
categories of HtM households and analyze their behavior and, thus, assume that the
available savings instruments are a liquid asset (M) and an illiquid one (A).
Kaplan et al. (2014) defined a household, as N-HtM if it holds a positive amount
of liquid and illiquid wealth: M > 0 and A ≥ 0; as P-HtM if it does not hold any liquid or
illiquid wealth: M ≤ 0 and A ≤ 0; and as W-HtM if it holds a sizable amount of illiquid
wealth but no liquid wealth: M = 0 and A > 0.
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I split P-HtM into two HtM groups: IP-HtM and NIP-HtM and define a
household as IP-HtM if it has a negative amount of net illiquid wealth, A < 0; and as
NIP-HtM if it holds zero net illiquid wealth, A = 0.
Let Ykt denote the income of household k in pay-period t, Akt denotes holdings of
illiquid assets, and Mkt denotes average balances of liquid wealth over the pay periods. I
follow the definitions of W-HtM and P-HtM households as used in Kaplan et al. (2014)
and assume that resources are consumed at a constant rate and define non-credit
constrained households as those whose average liquid wealth balances are positive (they
do not borrow) but are equal to or less than half their earning per pay-period.
In this case a household is W-HtM if
Akt > 0 and 0 ≤ Mkt ≤

𝑌𝑘𝑡

(1.1)

2

A household is P-HtM if
Akt ≤ 0 and 0 ≤ Mkt ≤

𝑌𝑘𝑡

(1.2)

2

I further use the criterion to identify the more minute categories of P-HtM.
A household is IP-HtM if
Akt < 0 and 0 ≤ Mkt ≤

𝑌𝑘𝑡

(1.3)

2

and a household is NIP-HtM if
Akt = 0 and 0 ≤ Mkt ≤

𝑌𝑘𝑡

(1.4)

2
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As shown in Kaplan et al. (2014), the estimator on the number of HtM is a lower
bound because some HtM household might hold, on average, liquid balances above half
their earnings.2
I now consider the HtM household at the credit limit − Mkt < 0 so that it
consumes all its cash-on-hand for the period, plus all its available credit. Credit limit
refers to the maximum amount of credit financial institutions extend to a household
through a line of credit as well as the maximum amount credit card companies allow a
household to spend on cards.
A household is W-HtM if
Akt > 0, Mkt ≤ 0 and Mkt ≤

𝑌𝑘𝑡
2

− Mkt

(1.5)

− Mkt

(1.6)

A household is P-HtM if
Akt ≤ 0, Mkt ≤ 0 and Mkt ≤

𝑌𝑘𝑡
2

I use the criterion to identify an IP-HtM household if
Akt < 0, Mkt ≤ 0 and Mkt ≤

𝑌𝑘𝑡
2

− Mkt

(1.7)

I identify a NIP-HtM household if
Akt = 0, Mkt ≤ 0 and Mkt ≤

𝑌𝑘𝑡
2

− Mkt

(1.8)

I identify in the data the different categories of households: the W-HtM
households by combining (1.1) and (1.5), the P-HtM by combining (1.2) and (1.6), the
IP-HtM by combining (1.3) and (1.7), and NIP-HtM by combining (1.4) and (1.8).
Using the SCF’s ten waves (1989- 2016) I identify the IP-HtM households in the
United States starting with the core SCF sample and drop households whose income is
2

A household can start a period with liquid savings, earn a certain income and end the period with zero
liquid assets. This household is HtM, but by the criterion used is counted as N-HtM.
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negative and those for which all income comes from self-employment and keep
households where the head is 22–79 years old. The final sample has 39,395 observations
over the pooled 10 sample years. The SCF survey is triennial. Table 1.1 summarizes the
survey years used in the sample selection and the final sample sizes. In selecting the
definition of income, I include all labor income, any government transfers that are regular
inflows of liquid assets. Because of their irregular perception, I exclude interest,
dividends, and other capital income. The definitions of income, liquid assets, liquid debts,
and net illiquid wealth are set forth in Table 1.2. Net liquid asset is liquid assets minus
liquid debts.
Table 1.3 provides some descriptive statistics on household income, liquid and
illiquid wealth holdings, and portfolio composition based on the pooled 1989-2016 SCF
data. The typical household portfolio structure consists of liquid wealth in the form of
bank accounts and illiquid wealth in the form of housing equity and private retirement
accounts. The median holdings of other financial assets such as directly held stocks,
bonds, and life insurance are zero everywhere. Guiso, Halassios, and Jappelli (2002)
derived similar results in their empirical studies of household portfolios. Housing equity
forms most of illiquid wealth for households. About 50 percent of households have
positive private retirement wealth and around 26 percent of households hold positive life
insurance.
Figure 1.1 plots the distribution of liquid wealth to monthly income considering
the pooled 1989-2016 SCF data. It shows that the ratio is 0 for about 4 percent of the
households and about 2.5 for 6.25 percent of the households in the United States.
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1.4 The Share of Indebted Hand-to-Mouth Households
I base my estimation of IP-HtM on Equations (1.3) and (1.7). In the benchmark
analysis, the pay frequency was set to two weeks and the household credit limit was set to
one month of income.
Figure 1.2(a) explores the fraction of HtM households in the United States
population over the period 1989–2016 in SCF data and depicts the split between IP-HtM,
NIP-HtM, and W-HtM. Estimates report that, on average, 0.6 percent of the United States
households were IP-HtM until the 2008-2009 Great Recession. It rose to about 2 percent
during the recession and started to fall during the recovery periods after 2010. Figure
1.2(a) also shows that IP-HtM was about 6 percent of the P-HtM before the recession and
the proportion increased to around 14 percent during the recession. The share of IP-HtM
in P-HtM started to fall after 2010 and again reached to around 6 percent in 2015. The
share of all HtM households increased during the recession.
Figures 1.2(b), 1.2(c), and 1.2(d) focus on the illiquid portfolio3 distribution (only
housing wealth, other illiquid but no housing wealth4, both other and housing wealth)
(Table 1.2) of the different categories of HtM. Figure 1.2(b) plots the share of IP-HtM
households that own housing, non-housing illiquid wealth, or both. About 90 percent of
IP-HtM households have both, around 10 percent have positive housing but no
nonhousing illiquid wealth, and no household has only nonhousing illiquid wealth. Figure
1.2(c) shows that almost all NIP-HtM households have only nonhousing illiquid wealth,
however overall their net illiquid wealth is zero. Figure 1.2(d) shows that around 28

3

Here only illiquid assets (no illiquid debts) are under consideration in portfolio composition analysis.

4

All other components of illiquid wealth except housing.
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percent of W-HtM households have both housing wealth and other types of illiquid
wealth, about 27 percent have positive housing but no nonhousing illiquid wealth, and
approximately 45 percent have only nonhousing illiquid wealth. Not surprisingly, I
notice the highest share of W-HtM with both housing wealth and other types of illiquid
wealth in 2007.
Figure 1.3 shows that about 30 percent of households whose leverage ratio is
higher than 1 is IP-HtM, as regular mortgage payments absorb a significant fraction of
disposable income and leave households little or no liquid savings.
Robustness
Figure 1.4 and Table 1.4 report sensitivity analyses. Figure 1.4(a) plots the shares
of IP-HtM, NIP-HtM, and W-HtM households weighted by income. The weighted
fraction of IP-HtM, NIP-HtM, and W-HtM households is smaller than its unweighted
counterpart. Figure 1.4(b) shows the HtM shares when considering the pay period as 1
month instead of 2 weeks: the fraction of IP-HtM, NIP-HtM, and W-HtM household
increases by 17, 18, and 34 percent, respectively (the fraction of IP-HtM, NIP-HtM, and
W-HtM increase by 0.1, 1.9, and 5.2 percentage points, respectively). Likewise, the fifth
line of Table 1.4 reports that when setting the pay period to 1 week, the share of IP-HtM
and NIP-HtM household drops correspondingly by 17 percent and 13 percent.
Figure 1.4(c) shows that the fraction of IP-HtM households drops by 33 percent,
with only a 3 percent decrease in NIP-HtM households if using the self-reported credit
limit instead of 1 month of income as a credit limit. Lastly, Figure 1.4(d) explores that if
vehicles are included as illiquid wealth, about half of the IP-HtM and NIP-HtM move
into the W-HtM group.

15

1.5 Demographics and Portfolio Composition of Indebted Hand-to-Mouth
Households
Figure 1.5 depicts the share of the different HtM households: IP-HtM, NIP-HtM,
and W-HtM by age. The majority of observations of NIP-HtM household behavior occur
in the early stages of the life cycle, at which time most people do not have any type of
illiquid assets. The fraction of NIP-HtM households drops abruptly until age 30, as they
acquire illiquid assets, and keeps dropping steadily over the life cycle until reaching
around 6 percent at age 79. Figure 1.5 shows that the age profile of the fraction of WHtM households is prominently hump-shaped: it peaks at around age 38, and remains
above 12 percentage points over the life cycle. Focusing on the IP-HtM households, there
is no apparent age trend as the share of IP-HtM is consistently around 0.6 percent of the
population for all age groups.
Figure 1.6 focuses on different demographic characteristics by age for the HtM
households. Figure 1.6(a) indicates that IP-HtM and W-HtM groups have, on average,
two more years of education than NIP-HtM households. In Figure 1.6(b), I cannot
differentiate between IP-HtM and W-HtM households in terms of marital status.
However, the NIP-HtM households are 35 percent less likely to be married. In terms of
having children, Figure 1.6(c) shows that IP-HtM, NIP-HtM, and W-HtM households are
indistinguishable. Figure 1.6(e) indicates that W-HtM households are less likely to have
a member of their household unemployed than both categories of P-HtM.
Figure 1.6(d) reveals that, on average, IP-HtM households have a higher median
income during the working years than NIP-HtM households. The interesting outcome is
that the IP-HtM group is very similar to the W-HtM in terms of their income path, the
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median income for NIP-HtM is about $15,000, while for W-HtM and IP-HtM it is about
$20,000 higher, following a hump-age profile with the peak at about $40,000. IP-HtM
and W-HtM have very similar patterns regarding their access of governments benefits,
both in terms of what proportion of their income is due to government benefits (Figure
6(f)) and the fraction of households that receive governments benefits (Figure 6(g)).
There are about 20 percentage points more NIP-HtM than W-HtM and IP-HtM
households that receive some form of government benefits and it is striking to notice that
in most respects IP-HtM are more similar with W-HtM than with NIP-HtM households.
In fact, out of the seven demographic characteristics analyzed, for five of them IP-HtM
are similar to W-HtM and dissimilar from NIP-HtM, and for one a pattern cannot be
observed. Only for one aspect are IP-HtM similar to NIP-HtM and different from WHtM.
Figure 1.7 reports the age profile of the portfolio composition of IP-HtM, NIPHtM, and W-HtM households. Figure 1.7(a) explores the finding that median net liquid
wealth holdings are zero at virtually every age for both the NIP-HtM and W-HtM
households. Median net liquid wealth for IP-HtM households is, on an average, negative.
Figure 1.7(b) shows that IP-HtM households are indebted in illiquid wealth whereas the
W-HtM households have substantial amounts of illiquid wealth. Figures 1.7(c) and 1.7(d)
plot the mean net liquid and illiquid wealth composition of the three HtM groups. Figure
1.7(c) reveals that the IP-HtM and W-HtM households have negative mean net liquid
wealth whereas it is zero for the NIP-HtM group across the life cycle. Figure 1.7(d)
explores the similar pattern of age profile as observed in Figure 1.7(b) for all HtM
groups. Figure 1.7(e) shows that the IP-HtM households have a higher mean fraction of
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illiquid wealth in housing in all stages of the life cycle. Figure 1.7(f) shows that the IPHtM group holds a negative mean fraction of illiquid wealth in retirement accounts
whereas the fraction falls steadily for the W-HtM through their life cycle. Figures 1.7(e)
and 1.7(f) show that, in fact, all the illiquid wealth of the IP-HtM households is in
housing, and retirement is a very negligible part of their portfolio.
Figure 1.8 articulates the income and balance-sheet composition of IP-HtM, NIPHtM, and W-HtM households over the years. Figures 1.8(a) and 1.8(b) explore that the
IP-HtM and W-HtM groups have higher median and mean income than the NIP-HtM
households all over the waves. One can also see that the mean and median income of IPHtM fluctuate more than the W-HtM households. Figures 1.8(c) and 1.8(d) show the
median and mean net liquid wealth of different HtM households. The median net liquid
wealth for IP-HtM is negative while, on average, it is zero for the other HtM groups.
Though the mean liquid wealth is zero for the NIP-HtM, it is negative for other HtM
households. Figures 1.8(e) and 1.8(f) reveal that the median and mean illiquid wealth are
negative for the IP-HtM, zero for the NIP-HtM, and significantly positive for the W-HtM
in all waves used.
1.6 The Share of Indebted Hand-to-Mouth Households Based on Race and Regions
I begin with the PSID core sample. Eliminated are households with missing
values on education of head, race of head, or region where head grew up. Also dropped
are households whose income grow more than 500 percent, fall by more than 80 percent,
or are below $100 and top-coded income. I also drop the households where the head is
less than 30 or more than 57 years old. The final sample has 50,475 observations over the
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pooled 9 sample years. Table 1.5 displays the definitions of income, liquid assets, liquid
debts, and net illiquid wealth. Net liquid asset is liquid assets minus liquid debts. The
definitions of income and wealth and the IP-HtM status indicators are the same as
mentioned in Section 3. The pay period is set at every two weeks and the credit limit at 1
month of income.
Table 1.6 shows that 1.40 percent of households are IP-HtM in my PSID pooled
1999-2015 waves in the United States. Table 1.6 also reports that 19.6 percent of
households are NIP-HtM and about 24 percent of households are W-HtM.
Table 1.7 shows that the maximum share of the IP-HtM households are White,
whereas Black households have the majority percentage in cases of P-HtM and NIP-HtM.
The highest percentage of W-HtM households is White. Table 1.8 reveals that the highest
percentage of all types of HtM households is from the southern part of the United States.
1.7 Status Persistence of Indebted Hand-to-Mouth Households in PSID Data
Tables 1.9 and 1.10 analyze the persistence of the status of the households under
consideration in PSID data. Table 1.9 depicts the forward transient state of different HtM
and N-HtM households. Row 1 of Table 1.9 reports that about 1, 26, 28, and 45 percent
of IP-HtM move to IP-HtM, NIP-HtM, W-HtM, and N-HtM, respectively, in the
following wave. Row 2 shows that about 1, 25, 26, and 48 of NIP-HtM households move
to IP-HtM, NIP-HtM, W-HtM, and N-HtM correspondingly in the next wave. Row 3
displays the transient state of W-HtM and shows the similar pattern of transition to that of
NIP-HtM. Row 4 shows that about 2, 25, 25, and 49 of N-HtM households shift to IPHtM, NIP-HtM, W-HtM, and N-HtM, respectively, in the following wave. Given that
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IP-HtM represent at the most 3 percent of all the households in the sample, it is not
surprising that a small percentage of NIP-HtM, W-HtM, and N-HtM end up being IPHtM in the next wave. It is interesting to note that the IP-HtM is very transient, as only
1.1 percent of the affected households stay this way, and, in fact, about 45 percent of
them end up being N-HtM. The probability of IP-HtM becoming N-HtM is, however, the
smallest out of all the categories of households under consideration.
Table 1.10 reveals the probability of backward transient state of different HtM
and N-HtM households. Column 1 of Table 1.10 explores that 1, 21, 26, and 52 of IPHtMs were in the group of IP-HtM, NIP-HtM, W-HtM, and N-HtM, respectively, in the
previous wave. Column 2 shows that about 2, 24, 25, and 49 of NIP-HtM belonged to IPHtM, NIP-HtM, W-HtM, and N-HtM correspondingly in the last wave. Column 3 reports
that about 2, 24, 27, and 47 of W-HtM belonged to IP-HtM, NIP-HtM, W-HtM, and NHtM, respectively in the previous wave. Column 4 displays that about 1.5, 23, 26, and 49
of N-HtM belonged to IP-HtM, NIP-HtM, W-HtM, and N-HtM correspondingly in the
last wave.
1.8 Conclusion
This paper examines the IP-HtM households previously ignored in the literature
using the share of IP-HtMs in the United States. I find that about 1 percent of total
households (more than 3 million people) and 6 percent of the P-HtM in the United States
are IP-HtM in the pooled SCF 1989-2016 data. However, this increased to around 3
percent during the Great Recession in 2008-2009 and fell during the recovery. I find
almost the same share of IP-HtM households in the PSID survey data.
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In previous studies, IP-HtM households were a share of P-HtM households.
Nevertheless, I show that one cannot integrate IP-HtM households into the P-HtM group
since demographic characteristics are far more similar to W-HtM than NIP-HtM. In fact,
for more than three quarters of the characteristics analyzed, IP-HtMs are virtually
indistinguishable from the W-HtMs. However, one cannot assimilate IP-HtM with WHtM because their portfolio composition is different from W-HtM. Therefore, IP-HtM
households must have their own separate status in the literature.
Overall, this study reveals three main findings by analyzing United States data.
First, I find that between 0.6 and 3 percent of United States households are IP-HtM.
Second, in terms of demographic characteristics, IP-HtM households are more similar to
the W-HtM rather than to the P-HtM, the category in which they were previously
assimilated. Third, the highest percentage of all HtM households is concentrated in the
southern part of the United States and the maximum share of IP-HtMs is among White
households.
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TABLES
Table 1. 1 Summary Information on the Survey Data Used
Survey years
Initial sample size

SCF 1989-2016
47,776

Exclusions
Not age 22–79
Negative income
All income from self-employment

2,858
10
5,513

Final sample size

39,395

Source: Author’s calculations based on the pooled 1989–2016 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) United
States. See text for full description of the data.

Table 1. 2 Definitions of Income, Liquid assets, Liquid Debts, and Net Illiquid wealth
(SCF)
Items
Income

Components
Gross wages and salaries, self-employment income, regular
private transfers such as child support and alimony, public
transfers such as unemployment benefits, food stamps, and
Social Security Income (SSI), and regular income from other
sources excluding investment income.

Liquid assets

Checking and savings accounts, money markets and call
accounts, directly held mutual funds, stocks, corporate bonds
and government bonds.

Liquid debts

Summation of all credit card balances that accrue interest after
the most recent payment.

Net illiquid wealth

Value of housing, residential and non-residential real estate, net
of mortgages and home equity loans, private retirement
accounts (such as 401(k)s, IRAs, thrift accounts, and future
pensions), cash value of life insurance policies, certificates of
deposit, and savings bonds.
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Table 1. 3 Household Income, Liquid and Illiquid Wealth Holdings, and Portfolio
Composition
Median

Mean

Fraction Positive

Income (age 22-59)

30,984

49,279

0.988

Net worth

77,136

334,083

0.904

Net liquid wealth

2,787

96,595

0.783

Cash, checking, saving, MM accounts

3,333

27,024

0.909

Directly held stocks

0

32,925

0.167

Directly held bonds

0

8,607

0.023

Revolving credit card debt

0

1,670

0.429

Net illiquid wealth

67,370

23,7488

0.787

Housing net of mortgages

40,714

149,176

0.66

Retirement accounts

153

73,233

0.503

Life insurance

0

8,193

0.256

Source: Author’s calculations based on the pooled 1989–2016 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) United
States, age limit 22-79. See text for full description of the data.
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Table 1. 4 Robustness Results for Fraction HtM in Each HtM Category

Baseline
Financially fragile
householdsa
Reported credit limit
1-year income credit limit
Weekly pay period
Monthly pay period
Higher illiquid wealth cutoffb
Retirement account as liquid
for 60+c
Businesses as illiquid assetsd
Direct as illiquid assetse
Other valuables as illiquid
assets
Excludes cc puzzle
households
Home Equity Line of Credits
(HELOCs) as liquid debt
Usual income
Disposable income Reportedf
Disposable income - Singlef
Committed consumptionbeginning of periodg
Committed consumption-end
of periodh

P-HtMi
0.109
0.175

IP-HtMi
0.006
0.009

NIP-HtMi
0.103
0.167

W-HtMi
0.153
0.305

0.104
0.094
0.094
0.129
0.117
0.109

0.004
0.003
0.005
0.007
0.117
0.006

0.100
0.091
0.090
0.122
0.000
0.103

0.115
0.094
0.122
0.205
0.145
0.145

0.103
0.108
0.105

0.005
0.006
0.006

0.097
0.103
0.099

0.154
0.169
0.157

0.151

0.006

0.145

0.143

0.108

0.005

0.102

0.154

0.110
0.108

0.007
0.006

0.104
0.103

0.163
0.151

0.107
0.090

0.006
0.005

0.102
0.086

0.150
0.133

0.139

0.00

0.131

0.214

Source: Author’s calculations based on United States SCF pooled 1989–2016. See text for full description.
a. Includes those households within $2,000 in liquid assets of their income threshold as HtM.
b. Requires households to have above $1,000 in illiquid assets to be considered W-HtM.
c. Puts retirement accounts into liquid wealth for households above age 60.
d. Drops the self-employment income sample selection and adds business assets to illiquid wealth and
self-employment income to income.
e. Classifies directly held mutual funds, stocks, and corporate and government bonds as illiquid assets.
f. Subtracts federal income taxes estimated from NBER’s TAXSIM from income. Disposable income
(reported) assumes that each household files its actual marital status and number of children as dependents;
disposable income (single) assumes that every household files as single with no dependents.
g. Assumes the household’s committed consumption is incurred at the beginning of the period.
h. Assumes the household’s committed consumption is incurred at the end of the period.
i. P-HtM = poor - HtM; IP-HtM = indebted poor - HtM; NIP-HtM = not indebted poor - HtM;
W-HtM = wealthy - HtM
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Table 1. 5 Definitions of Consumption, Income, Liquid Assets, Liquid Debts and Net
Illiquid Wealth (PSID)
Items
Income

Components
Government transfers plus labor earnings of a household.

Liquid assets

Money market funds, value of checking and savings accounts,
certificates of deposit, savings bonds, and treasury bills, together
with directly held shares of stock in publicly held corporations,
investment trusts or mutual funds.

Liquid debts

Value of debts such as student loans, medical or legal bills, credit
cards, and personal loans.

Net illiquid wealth

Summation of the value of private annuities or IRAs, value of
home equity, net value of other real estate, value of other
investments in trusts or estates, bond funds, and life insurance
policies.

Table 1. 6 Fraction of HtM Households, PSID pooled 1999-2015 Waves, United States
Year
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
2011
2013
2015
Mean

P-HtM
0.174
0.170
0.178
0.183
0.182
0.252
0.244
0.265
0.246
0.210

IP-HtM
0.007
0.007
0.008
0.008
0.006
0.029
0.031
0.025
0.010
0.014

NIP-HtM
0.167
0.163
0.169
0.175
0.176
0.224
0.213
0.240
0.236
0.196

W-HtM
0.234
0.260
0.271
0.281
0.269
0.251
0.203
0.180
0.206
0.239

Table 1. 7 Percentage of IP-HtM, NIP-HtM, and W-HtM Households Based on Races
P-HtM (%)

IP-HtM (%)

NIP-HtM (%)

W-HtM (%)

White

33.52

53.41

32.29

55.74

Black

59.41

37.03

60.79

36.89

Others

7.08

9.56

6.92

7.37

Source: Author’s calculations based on the United States Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) pooled
1999-2015 waves, age limit 30-57. See text for full description.
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Table 1. 8 Percentage of IP-HtM, NIP-HtM, and W-HtM Households Based on Regions
P-HtM (%)

IP-HtM (%)

NIP-HtM (%)

W-HtM (%)

Northeast

10.52

8.06

10.72

12.82

Midwest

21.87

22.78

21.79

24.08

South

48.94

43.95

49.35

47.67

West

18.66

25.20

18.14

15.44

Source: Author’s calculations based on the United States Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) pooled
1999-2015 waves, age limit 30-57. See text for full description.

Table 1. 9 Probability of Forward Transient state of HtM Households
IP-HtM

NIP-HtM

W-HtM

N-HtM

→
IP-HtM

0.011

0.261

0.278

0.449

NIP-HtM

0.013

0.246

0.261

0.479

W-HtM

0.014

0.241

0.262

0.482

N-HtM

0.016

0.247

0.246

0.490

Source: Author’s calculations based on the United States Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) pooled
1999-2015 waves, age limit 30-57. See text for full description.

Table 1. 10 Probability of Backward Transient state of HtM Households
IP-HtM

NIP-HtM

W-HtM

N-HtM

→
IP-HtM

0.012

0.017

0.018

0.015

NIP-HtM

0.207

0.237

0.243

0.234

W-HtM

0.256

0.254

0.267

0.258

N-HtM

0.524

0.491

0.472

0.493

Source: Author’s calculations based on the United States Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) pooled
1999-2015 waves, age limit 30-57. See text for full description.
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FIGURES
Figure 1. 1 Distribution of Liquid Wealth to Monthly Income Ratios
Fraction of households
0.07
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0.02
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0
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10

Ratio of net liquid wealth to labor income
Source: Author’s calculations based on the pooled 1989–2016 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), United
States, age limit 22-79. See text for full description of the data.
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Figure 1. 2 Fraction of Hand-to-Mouth (HtM) Households, United States
Figure 1.2(a) Share of IP-HtM, NIP-HtM and W-HtM

Figure 1.2(b) Portfolio composition of IP-HtM
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Figure 1.2(d) Portfolio composition of W-HtM

Figure 1.2(c) Portfolio composition of NIP-HtM
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Source: Author’s calculations based on the pooled 1989–2016 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), United
States, age limit 22-79. See text for full description of the data.
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Figure 1. 3 Share of HtM Households among Homeowners by Leverage Ratio
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Source: Author’s calculations based on the pooled 1989–2016 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), United
States, age limit 22-79. See text for full description of the data.
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Figure 1. 4 Fraction of HtM Households, United States, Alternate Definitions
Figure 1.4(a) Income-weighted share of HTM
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Figure 1.4(d) Vehicles in illiquid wealth
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Source: Author’s calculations based on the pooled 1989–2016 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF),
United States, age limit 22-79. See text for full description of the data.
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Figure 1. 5 Age Profile of Fraction of IP-HtM, NIP-HtM, and W- HtM Households
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Note: Age refers to that of the head of the household. Author’s calculations based on the pooled 1989–2016,
Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) United States, age limit 22-79. See text for full description of the data.

Figure 1. 6 Age Profile of the IP-HtM, NIP-HtM, and W- HtM, United States, by
Demographic Characteristics
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Figure 1.6(c) Average number of children
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Figure 1.6(f) Fraction of income from government benefits

Figure 1.6(e) Fraction with at least one unemployed member
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Figure 1.6(g) Fraction of households who receive government benefits
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Note: Age refers to that of the head of the household. Average years of education refer to that of the head of
the household. Author’s calculations based on the pooled 1989–2016, Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF)
United States, age limit 22-79. See text for full description of the data.
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Figure 1. 7 Age Profile of the Portfolio Composition of the IP-HtM, NIP-HtM, and WHtM Households
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Figure 1.7(c) Mean net liquid wealth
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Figure 1.7(f) Mean fraction of illiquid wealth in retirement account
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Note: Age refers to that of the head of household. To reduce the sensitivity to outliers, I compute means
after trimming the overall top and bottom 0.1 percent of the statistic’s distribution. Author’s calculations
based on the pooled 1989–2016, Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) United States, age limit 22-79. See text
for full description of the data.
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Figure 1. 8 Income and Portfolio Composition5 of different HtM Households over the
Years
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Note: Author’s calculations based on the pooled 1989–2016, Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) United
States, age limit 22-79. See text for full description of the data.

5

Visit Table A 1.1 and A1.2 in Appendices for more information.
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APPENDIX
Table A1. 1 Portfolio Characteristics by HtM Status.
Different HtM Households
Liquid wealth / monthly income: mean

WHtM
-1.243

NHtM
18.069

IPHtM
-2.108

NIPHtM
-0.444

Liquid wealth / monthly income: p10

-3.691

-0.035

-5.291

-0.633

Liquid wealth / monthly income: p25

-1.611

0.601

-2.718

0

Liquid wealth / monthly income: p50

0.001

1.995

-1.23

0

Liquid wealth / monthly income: p75

0.103

7.873

0.069

0.062

Liquid wealth / monthly income: p90

0.187

30.675

0.168

0.147

Housing fraction of illquid wealth: mean

0.595

0.593

1.267

.

Housing fraction of illquid wealth: p10

0

0

1

.

Housing fraction of illquid wealth: p25

0.161

0.29

1

.

Housing fraction of illquid wealth: p50

0.821

0.657

1

.

Housing fraction of illquid wealth: p75

1

0.96

1.261

.

Housing fraction of illquid wealth: p90

1

1

1.68

.

Retirement fraction of illquid wealth: mean

0.331

0.328

-0.29

.

Retirement fraction of illquid wealth: p10

0

0

-0.664

.

Retirement fraction of illquid wealth: p25

0

0

-0.246

.

Retirement fraction of illquid wealth: p50

0.044

0.23

0

.

Retirement fraction of illquid wealth: p75

0.629

0.588

0

.

Retirement fraction of illquid wealth: p90

1

0.993

0

.

Fraction with negative liquid wealth

0.384

0.104

0.574

0.113

Fraction with positive equity in housing

0.786

0.708

0

0

Fraction with positive retirement

0.542

0.613

0.407

0

Fraction with negative illiquid wealth

0

0.027

1

0

Source: Author’s calculations based on the Pooled 1989–2016, Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) United
States, age limit 22-79. See text for full description of the data.
Note: To reduce the sensitivity outliers, means are computed after trimming the overall top and bottom 0.1
percent of that statistic’s distribution.
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Table A1. 2 Portfolio Composition of N-HtM Households

Waves
1999-2015

Net Illiquid wealth
Total
Median
3444000000 77000

Mean
194224

Net Liquid wealth
Total
Median
1543000000 13000

Mean
87016

1999

286100000

63000

146590

139300000

12000

71337

2001

345300000

73000

171198

177800000

12000

88130

2003

363800000

85500

177827

181300000

14600

89490

2005

499100000

110000

256628

196500000

15000

101043

2007

505100000

120000

256398

205800000

14000

104481

2009

402200000

88250

222975

190800000

15000

105746

2011

376900000

64500

186976

157000000

12000

77859

2013

318100000

56000

157477

154500000

11000

76479

2015

347000000

52000

176930

138200000

11800

70472

Source: Author’s calculations based on the United States Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) pooled
1999-2015 waves, age limit 30-57. See text for full description.
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CHAPTER 2
CONSUMPTION RESPONSE OF THE INDEBTED HAND-TO-MOUTH
HOUSEHOLDS TO TRANSITORY INCOME SHOCKS
2.1 Introduction
This chapter investigates how total consumption and different subcategories of
consumption such as food, nonfood, durable and nondurable goods of indebted hand-tomouth (IP-HtM) households react to a transitory income change. In addition, I describe
the responses to the unexpected income shocks for the social sector, healthcare, and
utilities, which are different components of nonfood items. I compare these results with
other hand-to-mouth households (discussed in Chapter 1), poor hand-to-mouth (P-HtM),
not indebted poor hand-to-mouth (NIP-HtM) and wealthy hand-to-mouth (W-HtM).
I collected pooled data from the Household and Individual Dataset for the period
of 1999-2015 at the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). I estimate the marginal
propensity to consume (MPC) out of transitory income shocks of the IP-HtMs for total
consumption and examine the MPCs of food, nonfood, durable and nondurable
consumption expenditure of IP-HtM households. In addition, I describe the MPCs for the
social sector, healthcare, and utilities, which are different items of the nonfood item
category.
A longitudinal data set that includes information on income, consumption, and
liquid and illiquid wealth at the household level is necessary to estimate the MPCs. I use
the 9 waves of pooled data (1999–2015) from the PSID survey on the United States
household portfolios.
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Using the methodology proposed by Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2008),
Kaplan and Violante (2010), and Kaplan et al. (2014), I estimate the consumption
response to transitory changes in income. Unlike these studies, I use the updated sample
periods with enriched data, estimate the transmission coefficients of income shocks to
consumption for IP-HtM households, and find the MPCs separately for other types of
HtM households. These two empirical analyses differentiate this study from Blundell et
al. (2008) and Kaplan et al. (2014).
In data, results show that in the baseline specification, MPC of the total
consumption for the IP-HtM households is 0.97. However, it is 0.42, 0.23, 0.48, 0.71, and
0.62 for nondurable, durable, nonfood, food, and utilities, respectively. In comparing
these results to the responses of P-HtM, NIP-HtM and W-HtM households, I find that the
consumption of IP-HtM households is the most responsive (highest MPC) for all
consumption items except durables, healthcare, and social sector expenditure in the
baseline specification. This suggests that the government can obtain the maximum
effectiveness of its stimulatory policies for the IP-HtM households. This study can help
government design and execute the fiscal policies directing the highest stimulatory effect
during economic slowdown.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: section two presents the
literature review, section three discusses the data and methodology, section four explores
the results and robustness, and the final section concludes.
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2.2 Literature Review
Several studies estimate MPC for different groups of households based on their
economic stratum. Using panel data on the United States households, Dynan, Skinner,
and Zeldes (2004), and McCarthy (1995) found that the MPC is higher for lower income
households. Likewise, Jappelli and Pistaferri (2014) using data on Italian households
found that the MPC of households with lower cash-on-hand is higher than that of the
more affluent households. Using a panel dataset of U.S. households, Filer and Fisher
(2007) identified households that are more likely to be credit constrained as those who
have filed for bankruptcy in the past 10 years. They found that these households tend to
earn lower incomes (before and after bankruptcy filing) and show higher MPCs. Using
data from the Household Expenditure Survey (HES), Murugasu, Wei, and Hwa (2013)
estimated the MPC out of disposable income for Malaysian households and examined
how the propensities differ across income brackets. Their findings show that the MPC
from income for poor households is higher when compared with higher income
households. The MPCs differ from 0.81 for those earning below Malaysian ringgit
1,000(RM1,000) to 0.25 for those earning above RM10,000.
Hayashi (1985) determined that the reasons poorer households have higher MPCs
are that they have credit-constraints, an inability to save and possibly lower levels of
financial knowledge. He also noted that credit constraints, or credit rationing, arise when
households cannot borrow the amount they desire. Lower income households have less
access to credit markets due to their current and expected future lower incomes in
addition to lower ownership of usable assets for collateral for loans. When subject to
temporary negative income shocks, these households would like to but are unable to

39

borrow against their expected future incomes and consume less than optimal at that point,
making it most likely that an increase in income will be consumed rather than saved.
Beverly and Sherraden (1999) considered the hypothesis that financial literacy
similarly plays a role in the savings and consumption behavior of households. Their
argument is that lower income individuals, who often have a lower level of education,
also tend to be less financially literate. Meanwhile, Lawrance (1991) and Bucks and
Pence (2008) showed that poorer households tend to have lower foresight when it comes
to financial planning. Therefore, lower income households are inclined to be less aware
of the available savings instruments and are less likely to surrender consumption to
accumulate assets, making consumption more sensitive to income shocks. Moreover, the
lower level of financial literacy makes lower income households less likely to buy
insurance to help smooth consumption from unanticipated income shocks. Furthermore,
Lusardi and Tufano (2015) emphasized that low-income households are less debt literate
and often engage in higher cost borrowing transactions.
By focusing on the different categories of HtM households, Kaplan et al. (2014)
estimated that the MPC of the W-HtM households is the highest, around 0.30. The point
estimate of the MPC for P-HtM is 0.24, and is less than 0.13 for N-HtM.
Knowing the MPC informs policy makers about the effects of fiscal stimulus
policies on aggregate consumption. MPC can, however be derived for finer categories of
consumption for a more precise targeting of these policies. Johnson, Parker, and Souleles
(2006) considered spending on strictly nondurable goods such as food and alcoholic
beverages (at and away from home), utilities (and fuels and public services), household
operations, public transportation, gas and motor oil, personal care, tobacco, and
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miscellaneous goods. They broadly defined nondurable goods adding expenditures on
apparel goods and services, healthcare expenditures (excluding payments by employers
or insurers), and reading materials, following Lusardi (1996), but did not include
education. They studied the response of consumption to the 2001 fiscal stimulus
implemented in the United States and show that 37 percent of the rebate goes toward
increased consumption of nondurable goods and about 11 percent toward increased
consumption of food. Kaplan and Violante (2014a) prepared a similar correction and
found close results. Misra and Surico (2014) refined the technique to account for
heterogeneity in the response of consumption and estimated a marginal propensity to
spend on nondurable goods of 0.25.
In his pioneering study, Bodkin (1959) designed an experiment looking at the
consumption behavior of World War II veterans after their receipt of unanticipated
dividend payments from the National Service Life Insurance. Bodkin considered the
dividend payments to be unexpected and that they represented a windfall source of
income and derived a point estimate of the MPC nondurables of 0.72. Souleles (1999)
exploited tax refunds between 1979 and 1990 and found the MPC for nondurable goods
out of a transitory income gain ranged between 0.5 and 0.9 within the quarter following
receipt and statistically significant.
Browning and Crossley (2003) estimated that the MPC for nondurable goods was
either zero or very small. However, the MPC for durable goods is very large for impatient
agents. Paradoxically, it can be large also for the patient agents if the agents are
unconstrained. They noted that patient agents without any constraint naturally carry
forward debt so that they are less able to maintain purchases of durables in distress.
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Parker, Souleles, Johnson, and McClelland (2013) showed the importance of
distinguishing between nondurable and total spending and found that households spent
between 0.12 and 0.30 of their 2008 United States stimulus payments on nondurable
goods; when durable goods are included this rises to between 0.50 and 0.90. These
studies adequately estimate the impact of a fiscal stimulus during an economic downturn;
nonetheless, because the MPC out of unexpected income gains is usually higher when
households are in a low earnings state, they may be overestimating the response of
consumption to a typical transitory income shock.
Browning and Crossley (2009) found in their study among Canadian unemployed
workers that those with lower unemployment benefits reduced expenditure on durable
goods more. Aaronson, Agarwal, and French (2012) showed households experiencing a
minimum wage increase augmented expenditure on durables more than on nondurables
and the collateralized debts of these households concomitantly rose.
Krueger and Perri (2011), using the Italian Survey of Household Income and
Wealth (1987-2008) and the two waves of the PSID (2004-2006) data, estimated that for
households that have neither wealth nor real estate nondurable consumption changes by
about 23 percent in response to a short run (two years) change in post-tax labor income;
whereas, financial wealth responds by about17 percent. They also found that changes in
spending on durable goods move in the same direction with income shocks but less so
than changes in spending on nondurables.
Christelis, Georgarakos, Jappelli, Pistaferri, and Rooij (2017) derived the average
MPC corresponding to nondurable consumption to be in the range of 0.15 to 0.25. They
also showed that it rises with age and is larger at low levels of economic resources.
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2.3 Data and Methodology
I use longitudinal PSID data to examine the consumption behavior of IP-HtM
households. Based on the definitions of different HtMs described in chapter 1, and using
the methodology proposed by Blundell et al. (2008), Kaplan and Violante (2010), and
Kaplan et al. (2014), I derive the MPC out of transitory income shocks for various HtM
households. For most specifications, I derive that the IP-HtM households have the highest
MPC out of unexpected change in income.
I use the updated sample period with enriched data to estimate the transmission
coefficients of income shocks to total consumption and various items of consumption for
IP-HtM households. I also find the MPCs separately for other types of HtM households.
These two empirical analyses make this study unique from Blundell et al. (2008) and
Kaplan et al. (2014).
2.3.1 Data Source, Sample Selection and Definitions
It is necessary to have a longitudinal data set with information on income,
consumption, and liquid and illiquid wealth at the household level to estimate the
consumption response to income shocks for IP-HtM households with different groups of
HtM households. I use 9 waves of pooled data (1999–2015) from the PSID.
I start with the PSID core sample and drop the households with missing values on
race of head, or region where head grew up, education of head. Also eliminated are
households whose income fall by more than 80 percent, or are below $100, grow more
than 500 percent, and top-coded income or consumption. Since the identification of the
coefficients of interest requires a minimum of three periods, I only keep the households
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that appear in the sample in at least three consecutive waves. I keep the households where
the head is 30-57 years old. The final sample has 50,475 observations over the pooled 9
sample years.
I follow Blundell, Pistaferri, and Saporta-Eksten (2016), and Kaplan et al. (2014)
to construct the consumption measure. Table 2.1 displays the definitions of consumption;
various items of consumption such as nondurable, durable, food and noon food; income;
liquid assets; liquid debts; and net illiquid wealth. Net liquid asset is liquid assets minus
liquid debts.
2.3.2 Methodology
I use the methodology of Kaplan et al. (2014) to estimate the consumption
response to transitory changes in income. A more detailed description of this
methodology is available in Blundell et al. (2008) and Kaplan and Violante (2010) I
mention only the important steps here:
(i)

Regressing log income and log consumption expenditures on year and cohort
dummies, education, race, family structure, employment, geographic
variables, and interactions of year dummies with education, race,
employment, and region.

(ii)

Constructing the first-differenced residuals of log consumption ∆𝑐𝑖𝑡 and log
income ∆𝑦𝑖𝑡 .

(iii)

A period is 2 years as the survey is biannual. The income process 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is an
error component model that consists of orthogonal permanent and i.i.d.
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(independently and identically distributed) components. Therefore, income
growth is represented by
∆𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖𝑡 + ∆𝜃𝑖𝑡
where 𝜃𝑖𝑡 is the transitory shock and 𝛼𝑖𝑡 is the permanent shock.
(iv)

The MPC, the Blundell et al. (2008) estimator of the transmission coefficient
of transitory income shocks to consumption is
̃𝑡 =
𝑀𝑃𝐶

(v)

𝑐𝑜𝑣 (∆𝑐𝑖𝑡, ∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡 +1 )
𝑐𝑜𝑣 (∆𝑦𝑖𝑡, ∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡 +1 )

The exact MPC out of a transitory shock is expressed as
𝑀𝑃𝐶𝑡 =

(vi)

𝑐𝑜𝑣 ( ∆𝑐𝑖𝑡, 𝜃𝑖𝑡 )
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝜃𝑖𝑡 )

The estimator in (iv) is a consistent estimator of (v) if the household has no
foresight of future shocks, explicitly:
𝑐𝑜𝑣 (∆𝑐𝑖𝑡, 𝛼𝑖,𝑡+1 ) = 𝑐𝑜𝑣 ( ∆𝑐𝑖𝑡, 𝜃𝑖,𝑡+1 ) = 0,

(vii)

The estimator is realized by an instrumental (IV) regression of ∆𝑐𝑖𝑡 on ∆𝑦𝑖𝑡 ,
instrumented by ∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡 +1 . It is mentioned that ∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡 +1 is correlated with the
transitory shock ( 𝜃𝑖𝑡 ) at t, but not with the permanent one ( 𝛼𝑖𝑡 ).

Kaplan and Violante (2010) indicate the presence of tight borrowing constraints does
not bias the estimate of the transmission coefficient for transitory shocks.
2.4 Results and Robustness
Table 2.2 provides the results for total consumption. The MPC of the IP-HtM
households is the highest, around 0.97 in the baseline specification. The point estimate of
the MPC for the P-HtM is 0.39, for the NIP-HtM 0.34, and for the W-HtM 0.37. This
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result is not surprising if one thinks of the IP-HtM as W-HtM facing temporary severe
financial constraints. There are two intuitions behind the responsiveness behavior of IPHtM. First, the IP-HtM households spend the maximum share of their income on
mortgage payments leaving a small portion for consumption. This results in high
responsiveness in their consumption behavior due to any positive income shock. Second,
IP-HtM households face credit constraints that induce them to spend most of their share
of increased transitory income for consumption.
The rest of the rows in Table 2.2 show robustness tests with respect to the
definition of household composition, income and consumption, and the assumed pay
period (monthly income). The MPCs of the IP-HtM group are always the highest among
all other HtM households as in the baseline specification. Under the definition of
“monthly pay period,” the MPC decreases for IP-HtM and W-HtM households, whereas
it increases for P-HtM and NIP-HtM households. If the definition is either “male
household head” or “pretax earnings” or “include food stamps,” the MPCs fall for all
types of HtM households. On the contrary, if the marital status of the head is stable, it
increases for all groups of HtM except W-HtM. Table 2.2 also reports that MPCs
decrease for P-HtM, NIP-HtM, and W-HtM if the sample is restricted to the households
of the continuously married.
The important outcome that the consumption of the IP-HtM shows the highest
sensitivity to temporary income shocks out of all HtM households is similar to the
findings of some recent studies. Baker (2013) incorporated several original sources of
household data on income, consumption expenditures, and household financial
statements to examine the co-movement of consumption and income at the micro level
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during the Great Recession. He shows that expenditures of highly indebted households
with illiquid assets are especially sensitive to income fluctuations. Cloyne and Surico
(2014) executed a long span of expenditure survey data for the United Kingdom and a
narrative measure of exogenous income tax changes. They also showed that the
homeowners with high leverage ratios present large and persistent consumption responses
to tax shocks. Misra and Surico (2014) built on the study of Johnson et al. (2006) and
Parker et al. (2013) on the 2001 and 2008 fiscal stimulus payment programs in the United
States. They found that for both stimulus episodes the largest propensity to consume out
of the tax rebate is among households that own real estate but have high levels of
mortgage debt.
Tables 2.3 and 2.4 show the MPC of nondurable consumption is higher than that
of the durable for all groups of HtM households except W-HtM in the baseline
specification. This finding is supported by Krueger and Perri (2011). For nondurable
consumption, the MPC of the IP-HtM households is the highest, around 0.42, among
other HtMs. On the other hand, W-HtM households are the most responsive for durable
consumption with the MPC of about 0.49.
Table 2.3 reveals that for the first three robustness tests the MPC of nondurable
drops for all groups of HtMs. In contrast to that, MPC increases for all if the pay period is
monthly instead of biweekly. Table 2.3 also shows that for households with stable marital
status, MPC of IP-HtM and W-HtM show the same pattern of change. However, MPC
changes in the opposite direction for these two groups if the household head is male.
Table 2.4 displays that only the MPCs of W-HtM households are statistically significant
for durable consumption.
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Table 2.5 summarizes the results for nonfood consumption. The point estimate of
the MPC for the IP-HtM is the highest, around 0.48 and for the W-HtM is the lowest,
0.27 in the baseline specification. The remaining rows in Table 2.5 offer a robustness
analysis and show that IP-HtM households are the most responsive out of all HtMs for all
alternative definitions.
Table 2.5 reports that for the first two robustness tests the MPC of nonfood
decreases for all groups of HtMs. On the other hand, MPC rises for all HtMs if the pay
period under consideration is monthly. I also observe in Table 2.5 that for households
with a stable marital status, MPC of IP-HtM and W-HtM changes in the same direction.
However, I see the opposite pattern of change of MPCs for these two groups if the
household head is male and the households are continuously married.
Table 2.6 explores the finding that the IP-HtM households are more responsive in
the food expenditure to sudden changes in income than other groups of HtMs in the
baseline specification.
The remaining rows in Table 2.6 offer a robustness analysis with respect to the
definition of income and consumption, household composition, and the assumed pay
period. I find statistically significant results only for IP-HtM and W-HtM households.
The ranking of MPC among the two HtMs is always as in the baseline specification.
Table 2.6 also shows that the MPC of IP-HtM declines for all alternative definitions. Like
IP-HtM, I see the same pattern of change of MPC for W-HtM with the only exception
being if I consider a monthly pay period.
Table 2.7 displays that IP-HtM households are the most responsive, around 0.62,
and NIP-HtM households are the least responsive, around 0.21, in utility expenditure to
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the transitory income shocks in the baseline. In robustness tests, only in the definitions of
“pre-tax earnings” and “include food stamps” does MPC change in the same direction for
IP-HtM and W-HtM. However, I see the opposite pattern of change of MPC of these two
groups for all other definitions in robustness tests.
Tables 2.8 and 2.9 show that the MPCs of healthcare and social sector (education
and healthcare together) consumption are statistically significant for all HtM households
except IP-HtM. P-HtM, NIP-HtM, and W-HtM households that experience income rises
tend to seek better education and healthcare (social sector consumption) and to send their
children to better educational institutions. For the first three alternative definitions and
“households with male head,” the MPCs of healthcare expenditure drop for all HtM
households except IP-HtM. Under the monthly pay period system, the MPCs of P-HtM
and NIP-HtM increase, whereas it decreases for W-HtM.
2.5 Conclusion
The study is a detailed analysis of how the total consumption and the different
subcategories of consumption such as food, nonfood, durable, nondurable, social sector,
utilities, and healthcare of the IP-HtM households react to the transitory income changes.
This study also compares these results to other HtM households.
Findings show that the MPC of the total consumption for IP-HtM is the highest
among all the categories of households in the baseline specification. The study also
shows that among all HtMs, the consumption of IP-HtM households is the most
responsive for all consumption items except durables, healthcare, and social sector
expenditure in the baseline specification. These results are also supported by some recent
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studies. Cloyne and Surico (2014) performed a long span of expenditure survey data for
the United Kingdom and a narrative measure of exogenous income tax variations. They
also found that the homeowners with high leverage ratios show large and persistent
consumption responses to tax changes. Misra and Surico (2014) built on the study of
Johnson et al. (2006) and Parker et al. (2013) on the 2001 and 2008 fiscal stimulus
payment programs in the United States. They showed that for both stimulus episodes the
largest responses to consumption out of the tax rebate is among households that own real
estate but have high levels of mortgage debt. Baker (2013) combined several original
sources of household data on consumption expenditures, income, and household financial
statements to examine the co-movement of consumption and income at the micro level
during the Great Recession. He finds that expenditures of highly indebted households
with illiquid assets are especially sensitive to income variations. Results suggest that the
stimulatory government’s policies have maximum effectiveness for the IP-HtM
households. This study can encourage governments to design and implement their fiscal
policies by aiming for the highest stimulatory effect during an economic downturn.
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TABLES
Table 2. 1 Definitions of Consumption, Income, Liquid Assets, Liquid Debts and Net
Illiquid Wealth (PSID)
Items
Consumption

Components
Utilities, public transportation, food, childcare, healthcare,
gasoline, car maintenance, and education.

Nondurable

Food, utilities, public transportation, and healthcare.

Durable

Cars (vehicle loan payment and down payment), housing
(mortgage payments), and home improvement (household
furnishing and equipment).

Nonfood

Utilities, public transportation, childcare, healthcare, gasoline,
car maintenance, and education.

Food

Food at home and away from home.

Social sector

Education and healthcare.

Income

Government transfers plus labor earnings of a household.

Liquid assets

Money market funds, value of checking and savings accounts,
certificates of deposit, savings bonds, and treasury bills,
together with directly held shares of stock in publicly held
corporations, investment trusts or mutual funds.

Liquid debts

Value of debts such as student loans, medical or legal bills,
credit cards, and personal loans.

Net illiquid wealth

Summation of the value of private annuities or IRAs, value of
home equity, net value of other real estate, value of other
investments in trusts or estates, bond funds, and life insurance
policies.
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Table 2. 2 Marginal Propensity to Consume out of Transitory Income Shocks for
Different Types of HtM Households (total consumption) a
P-HtM

IP-HtM

NIP-HtM

W-HtM

Baseline

0.391***
(0.089)

0.974***
(0.366)

0.344***
(0.092)

0.371***
(0.080)

Pre-tax earningsb

0.210***
(0.056)

0.861***
(0.283)

0.166***
(0.057)

0.215***
(0.060)

Include food
stampsc

0.380***
(0.087)

0.941***
(0.363)

0.335***
(0.090)

0.350***
(0.080)

Continuously
married
householdsd

0.280
(0.251)

1.401**
(0.678)

0.082
(0.276)

0.160
(0.126)

Stable marital
statuse

0.467***
(0.116)

1.110***
(0.364)

0.399***
(0.123)

0.333***
(0.089)

Households with
male headsf

0.220*
(0.113)

0.632
(0.429)

0.186
(0.117)

0.252***
(0.095)

Monthly incomeg

0.430***
(0.084)

0.958***
(0.287)

0.378***
(0.088)

0.350***
(0.073)

Source: Author’s calculations based on the United States Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) 19992015 waves, age limit 30-57. See text for full description.
a. Boot-strapped standard errors based on 250 replications in parentheses. Standard errors are in
parentheses. ***p < 0.01. **p < 0.05. *p < 0.10.
b. Gross income before taxes are paid. Transfers are excluded.
c. Food stamps are included among transfers.
d. Restricted to continuously married households.
e. Restricted to households with no change in marital status.
f. Households with female heads (mostly single) are excluded.
g. Pay period is set to one month instead of two weeks.
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Table 2. 3 Marginal Propensity to Consume out of Transitory Income Shocks for
Different Types of HtM Households (nondurable)a
P-HtM

IP-HtM

NIP-HtM

W-HtM

Baseline

0.230***
(0.060)

0.422**
(0.194)

0.217***
(0.064)

0.254***
(0.046)

Pre-tax earningsb

0.104***
(0.036)

0.410***
(0.152)

0.089**
(0.038)

0.157***
(0.035)

Include food
stampsc

0.215***
(0.057)

0.376*
(0.192)

0.204***
(0.060)

0.226***
(0.046)

Continuously
married
householdsd

0.214
(0.156)

0.415
(0.320)

0.177
(0.178)

0.185**
(0.077)

Stable marital
statuse

0.253***
(0.080)

0.295
(0.186)

0.249***
(0.088)

0.232***
(0.0530

Households with
male headsf

0.185***
(0.072)

0.540**
(0.241)

0.157**
(0.077)

0.174***
(0.055)

Monthly incomeg

0.272***
(0.056)

0.482***
(0.157)

0.256***
(0.060)

0.277***
(0.042)

Source: Author’s calculations based on the United States Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) 19992015 waves, age limit 30-57. See text for full description.
a. Boot-strapped standard errors based on 250 replications in parentheses. Standard errors are in
parentheses. ***p < 0.01. **p < 0.05. *p < 0.10.
b. Gross income before taxes are paid. Transfers are excluded.
c. Food stamps are included among transfers.
d. Restricted to continuously married households.
e. Restricted to households with no change in marital status.
f. Households with female heads (mostly single) are excluded.
g. Pay period is set to one month instead of two weeks.
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Table 2. 4 Marginal Propensity to Consume out of Transitory Income Shocks for
Different Types of HtM Households (durable)a
P-HtM

IP-HtM

NIP-HtM

W-HtM

Baseline

0.197
(0.475)

0.235
(0.605)

0.141
(0.576)

0.488***
(0.190)

Pre-tax earningsb

0.205
(0.269)

0.452
(0.465)

0.102
(0.313)

0.281**
(0.131)

Include food
stampsc

0.240
(0.362)

0.082
(0.601)

0.229
(0.416)

0.410**
(0.185)

Continuously
married
householdsd

0.704
(1.009)

1.899
(0.990)

0.012
(1.470)

0.191
(0.264)

Stable marital
statuse

0.598
(0.585)

0.652
(0.548)

0.582
(0.763)

0.319
(0.196)

Households with
male headsf

-0.003
(0.552)

0.298
(0.728)

-0.166
(0.679)

0.513**
(0.224)

Monthly incomeg

0.202
(0.439)

0.437
(0.469)

0.064
(0.553)

0.516***
(0.174)

Source: Author’s calculations based on the United States Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) 19992015 waves, age limit 30-57. See text for full description.
a. Boot-strapped standard errors based on 250 replications in parentheses. Standard errors are in
parentheses. ***p < 0.01. **p < 0.05. *p < 0.10.
b. Gross income before taxes are paid. Transfers are excluded.
c. Food stamps are included among transfers.
d. Restricted to continuously married households.
e. Restricted to households with no change in marital status.
f. Households with female heads (mostly single) are excluded.
g. Pay period is set to one month instead of two weeks.
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Table 2. 5 Marginal Propensity to Consume out of Transitory Income Shocks for
Different Types of HtM Households (nonfood)a
P-HtM

IP-HtM

NIP-HtM

W-HtM

Baseline

0.297***
(0.076)

0.483**
(0.224)

0.285***
(0.081)

0.275***
(0.054)

Pre-tax earningsb

0.126***
(0.047)

0.450**
(0.177)

0.112**
(0.050)

0.144***
(0.040)

Include food
stampsc

0.261***
(0.074)

0.426*
(0.224)

0.251***
(0.079)

0.232***
(0.053)

Continuously
married
householdsd

0.308**
(0.182)

0.555
(0.371)

0.261
(0.206)

0.172*
(0.090)

Stable marital
statuse

0.350***
(0.103)

0.299
(0.213)

0.355***
(0.113)

0.220***
(0.060)

Households with
male headsf

0.223**
(0.090)

0.684**
(0.282)

0.188*
(0.097)

0.183***
(0.064)

Monthly incomeg

0.338***
(0.070)

0.586***
(0.184)

0.319***
(0.076)

0.294***
(0.049)

Source: Author’s calculations based on the United States Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) 19992015 waves, age limit 30-57. See text for full description.
a. Boot-strapped standard errors based on 250 replications in parentheses. Standard errors are in
parentheses. ***p < 0.01. **p < 0.05. *p < 0.10.
b. Gross income before taxes are paid. Transfers are excluded.
c. Food stamps are included among transfers.
d. Restricted to continuously married households.
e. Restricted to households with no change in marital status.
f. Households with female heads (mostly single) are excluded.
g. Pay period is set to one month instead of two weeks.
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Table 2. 6 Marginal Propensity to Consume out of Transitory Income Shocks for
Different Types of HtM Households (food)a
P-HtM

IP-HtM

NIP-HtM

W-HtM

Baseline

0.063
(0.094)

0.710**
(0.311)

0.013
(0.010)

0.189***
(0.070)

Pre-tax earningsb

0.018
(0.058)

0.654***
(0.235)

-0.020
(0.061)

0.170***
(0.051)

Include food
stampsc

-0.053
(0.071)

0.378
(0.306)

-0.084
(0.074)

0.130**
(0.063)

Continuously
married
householdsd

-0.281
(0.238)

0.283
(0.463)

-0.402
(0.277)

0.167
(0.109)

Stable marital
statuse

0.027
(0.124)

0.627**
(0.303)

-0.040
(0.137)

0.182**
(0.081)

Households with
male headsf

-0.005
(0.112)

0.548
(0.355)

-0.053
(0.121)

0.117
(0.081)

Monthly incomeg

0.110
(0.085)

0.700**
(0.275)

0.058
(0.091)

0.231***
(0.063)

Source: Author’s calculations based on the United States Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) 19992015 waves, age limit 30-57. See text for full description.
a. Boot-strapped standard errors based on 250 replications in parentheses. Standard errors are in
parentheses. ***p < 0.01. **p < 0.05. *p < 0.10.
b. Gross income before taxes are paid. Transfers are excluded.
c. Food stamps are included among transfers.
d. Restricted to continuously married households.
e. Restricted to households with no change in marital status.
f. Households with female heads (mostly single) are excluded.
g. Pay period is set to one month instead of two weeks.
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Table 2. 7 Marginal Propensity to Consume out of Transitory Income Shocks for
Different Types of HtM Households (utilities)a
P-HtM

IP-HtM

NIP-HtM

W-HtM

Baseline

0.242**
(0.098)

0.622**
(0.285)

0.208**
(0.106)

0.212***
(0.060)

Pre-tax earningsb

0.121**
(0.059)

0.473**
(0.216)

0.099
(0.063)

0.109**
(0.044)

Include food
stampsc

0.216**
(0.094)

0.472*
(0.285)

0.195*
(0.100)

0.136**
(0.061)

Continuously
married
householdsd

-0.093
(0.210)

0.387
(0.477)

-0.193
(0.240)

0.215**
(0.097)

Stable marital
statuse

0.262
(0.126)

0.632**
(0.293)

0.217
(0.140)

0.164**
(0.068)

Households with
male headsf

0.161
(0.122)

0.639*
(0.350)

0.114
(0.132)

0.187***
(0.069)

Monthly incomeg

0.254***
(0.090)

0.587**
(0.225)

0.219**
(0.098)

0.245***
(0.056)

Source: Author’s calculations based on the United States Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) 19992015 waves, age limit 30-57. See text for full description.
a. Boot-strapped standard errors based on 250 replications in parentheses. Standard errors are in
parentheses. ***p < 0.01. **p < 0.05. *p < 0.10.
b. Gross income before taxes are paid. Transfers are excluded.
c. Food stamps are included among transfers.
d. Restricted to continuously married households.
e. Restricted to households with no change in marital status.
f. Households with female heads (mostly single) are excluded.
g. Pay period is set to one month instead of two weeks.
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Table 2. 8 Marginal Propensity to Consume out of Transitory Income Shocks for
Different Types of HtM Households (healthcare)a
P-HtM

IP-HtM

NIP-HtM

W-HtM

Baseline

0.749***
(0.246)

0.003
(0.843)

0.812***
(0.261)

0.587***
(0.176)

Pre-tax earningsb

0.509***
(0.168)

0.248
(0.759)

0.522***
(0.176)

0.528***
(0.147)

Include food
stampsc

0.479**
(0.232)

-0.330
(0.869)

0.540**
(0.244)

0.496***
(0.174)

Continuously
married
householdsd

0.170
(0.491)

-0.665
(1.675)

0.281
(0.516)

0.085
(0.277)

Stable marital
statuse

0.507*
(0.230)

-0.359
(0.809)

0.597*
(0.325)

0.640***
(0.203)

Households with
male headsf

0.733**
(0.291)

-0.053
(1.105)

0.797***
(0.306)

0.258
(0.203)

Monthly incomeg

0.7634***
(0.233)

0.064
(0.688)

0.833***
(0.250)

0.566***
(0.158)

Source: Author’s calculations based on the United States Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) 19992015 waves, age limit 30-57. See text for full description.
a. Boot-strapped standard errors based on 250 replications in parentheses. Standard errors are in
parentheses. ***p < 0.01. **p < 0.05. *p < 0.10.
b. Gross income before taxes are paid. Transfers are excluded.
c. Food stamps are included among transfers.
d. Restricted to continuously married households.
e. Restricted to households with no change in marital status.
f. Households with female heads (mostly single) are excluded.
g. Pay period is set to one month instead of two weeks.
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Table 2. 9 Marginal Propensity to Consume out of Transitory Income Shocks for
Different Types of HtM Households (social sector: healthcare and education) a
P-HtM

IP-HtM

NIP-HtM

W-HtM

Baseline

0.612***
(0.166)

-0.133
(0.516)

0.669***
(0.177)

0.469***
(0.114)

Pre-tax earningsb

0.317***
(0.106)

-0.007
(0.394)

0.332***
(0.112)

0.269***
(0.084)

Include food
stampsc

0.433***
(0.156)

-0.103
(0.473)

0.472***
(0.167)

0.302***
(0.111)

Continuously
married
householdsd

0.409
(0.344)

-0.313
(0.844)

0.557
(0.380)

0.407**
(0.186)

Stable marital
statuse

0.456**
(0.216)

-0.225
(0.533)

0.530**
(0.236)

0.432***
(0.130)

Households with
male headsf

0.652***
(0.196)

-0.085
(0.560)

0.717***
(0.211)

0.293**
(0.132)

Monthly incomeg

0.714***
(0.155)

0.079
(0.415)

0.771***
(0.1680

0.489***
(0.102)

Source: Author’s calculations based on the United States Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) 19992015 waves, age limit 30-57. See text for full description.
a. Boot-strapped standard errors based on 250 replications in parentheses. Standard errors are in
parentheses. ***p < 0.01. **p < 0.05. *p < 0.10.
b. Gross income before taxes are paid. Transfers are excluded.
c. Food stamps are included among transfers.
d. Restricted to continuously married households.
e. Restricted to households with no change in marital status.
f. Households with female heads (mostly single) are excluded.
g. Pay period is set to one month instead of two weeks.
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CHAPTER 3
DETERMINANTS OF HEALTHCARE EXPENDITURE OF A RESOURCECONSTRAINED COMMUNITY: EVIDENCE FROM RICKSHAW PULLERS
3.1 Introduction
Ill health adversely affects the standard of living, especially of the working class
of a society, by reducing real income. The pathways from ill health to poverty work
through the direct costs of treatment and non-medical care and the indirect costs of lost
income (due to days absent from work and reduced productivity) of the affected person.
The working-class population-for instance, daily laborers-become more efficient and
their working hours increase if they have good health. They go to work almost every day
and do a painstaking job. The health status of this population is affected by poverty, lack
of education and awareness, lack of available affordable and high-quality healthcare, and
negligence among policymakers. Auvinen (1997) showed that a well-planned healthcare
financing system protects a population against the financial risks of ill health. Aghion,
Caroli, and Garcia-Penalosa (1999) and Baer, Campino, and Cavalcanti (2001) presented
that households’ out-of-pocket (OOP) healthcare expenditure is a major component of
health system finance in middle- and low-income countries. Bardhan (1997) showed that
when households face substantial medical expenses, they are pushed into poverty or
forced deeper into poverty.
Low-income households like those of day laborers live from hand to mouth, and
they spend a large proportion of their income on their basic survival necessities. They
cannot afford their required healthcare services. They might decrease their healthcare
expenditure if there is any increase in OOP medical costs, and even small copayments
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might reduce the likelihood of receiving necessary healthcare. Healthcare providers can
give better services to the working-class population if they know the determinants of
healthcare expenditure among this group of people. The purpose of this study is to
estimate the determinants of healthcare expenditure in a resource-constrained population.
This study focuses on a survey conducted among rickshaw pullers (RPs) in Dhaka,
Bangladesh. RPs are representative of a resource-constrained community in a developing
country, since they have underprivileged social and economic status due to the nature of
the service they provide to their society, they have insufficient access to high-quality
healthcare services, and they lack human and physical capital. A survey of rickshaw
pullers conducted by Begum and Sen (2004) revealed that rickshaw driving on a regular
basis is extremely hard work, and about 85 percent of sampled respondents had left their
jobs due to their inability to continue such arduous work. They also found that about 75
percent of current and 90 percent of former drivers mentioned “physical exhaustion” and
“fatigue” when discussing rickshaw pulling.
According to the New Encyclopaedia Britannica (1993), “rickshaw” originated
from the Japanese word Jinrikisha, which literally means “human-powered vehicle”.
During the 1860s, rickshaws were first made in Japan (Saito, 1979). Rajvanshi (2002)
explained that rickshaws were used as a means of transportation for the social elite;
however, they still play an important role in the transportation system, particularly in
third-world countries. Hakim and Rahman (2016); Kamruzzaman and Hakim (2015); and
Hakim and Talukder (2016) showed that RPs are among the most disadvantaged
segments of the population.
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Rickshaw is one of the most important means of transportation in Bangladesh.
Almost all the RPs in Dhaka come from the rural areas of Bangladesh, since they do not
get work in the villages. Though driving a rickshaw is a hard job, their income is
inadequate to support their families. They don’t get proper medical treatment. Though a
rickshaw is a non-motorized and environmentally friendly means of transportation,
continuous driving for many years takes a huge toll on RPs’ physical ability (Begum &
Sen, 2005).
Bangladesh is one of the poorest countries in the world, with a per capita gross
domestic product (GDP) of US$747.34 in 2012 (World Health Organization, 2013). The
per capita income of the RP community was $260.12 in 2013 (Table 3.1), which falls
well below the threshold of $693.50 in a year, which is defined as extreme poverty
(World Bank, 2016).6 Per capita total health expenditure in Bangladesh was US$67 in
2011 (World Health Organization, 2011) and $14.84 in 2013 for the RP community
(Table 3.1). As one of the lower-middle–income countries, and with a population of 160
million (Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, 2016; July 2014 estimate), Bangladesh has been
struggling to improve its population’s health for long time. On average, households in
Bangladesh spend 11 percent of their total household budget on health (Rahman,
Gilmour, Saito, Sultana, & Shibuya, 2013), whereas households in the RP community
spend about 5.7 percent (Table 3.1).
In their study on RPs in rural Bangladesh, Islam, Hakim, Safeuzzaman, Hague,
and Alam (2016) showed that 72 percent of respondents earned about $4–5 and only 6

The World Bank (2016) defines “extreme poverty” as living on less than $1.90 per person per day. Based
on this information, the per capita annual income of an extremely poor person is below $693.50
(= $1.90*365).
6
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percent earned about $6 on a daily basis. They also found that 22 percent of respondents
were underweight, about 28 percent had a cough and cold, 18 percent had diarrhea, and
10 percent had asthma and gastric ulcers.
In my survey of RPs, respondents were asked about various aspects of healthcare
received over the last year and about illness and demographic information of household
members, such as age and years of schooling of the household head, family size, duration
of the illness episode, distance of the residence from the healthcare facility/hospital, etc.
Using this survey, the paper employs a flexible Box-Cox model regression method to find
the determinants of healthcare expenditure for a resource-constrained community. The
results suggest that households’ annual income, distance of residence from healthcare
center/hospital, age of the household head, duration of illness episode, years of schooling,
family size, and marital status affect healthcare expenditure. The income elasticity of
healthcare expenditure of about 0.55 implies that healthcare is a necessary good. This
study is unique in its analysis of the determinants of healthcare expenditure of the
working-class population, using cross-sectional microdata. The specific research
questions are:
i.

What are the impacts of duration of illness episode in the households of a
resource-constrained community on their healthcare spending?

ii.

Which individual household determinants, such as annual income, distance,
education, family size, and marital status, best explain household healthcare
expenditure?

iii.

Does the age of the household head play any role in the household’s
healthcare spending in a resource-limited community?
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The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the
literature review; section 3 discusses the methodology of the study, which explores the
sources of data and the methods followed; section 4 portrays the descriptive analysis for
the core sample; section 5 analyzes the results; and section 6 puts forward conclusions.
3.2 Literature Review
Wagstaff and Doorslaer (2000) portrayed that the healthcare OOP expenditure of
most low- and middle-income Asian countries was regressive, as social assistance and fee
exemptions were either non-existent or, where they existed, were not well targeted at
those who were most in need. Using household survey data from 11 Asian countries, Van
Doorslaer et al. (2006) showed that OOP payments are the key source of healthcare
financing, and the ratio of OOP payments to total household healthcare expenditure is
between 30 and 82 percent. They also found that the overall prevalence of absolute
poverty in 11 Southeast Asian countries is 14 percent higher than conventional estimates
of poverty that do not consider OOP payments for healthcare. In addition, they portrayed
that Vietnam, India, China, and Bangladesh depend to a great degree on OOP healthcare
spending, so experiencing an extensive catastrophic payment leads directly to poverty.
Su, Pokhrel, Gbangou, and Flessa (2006) presented that demographic
characteristics and severity of illness play an important role in healthcare expenditure.
Akanda and Minowa (2011) underlined the importance of analyses of demand for
healthcare and healthcare expenditure at the household level for effective health policy
formulation. They argued that efficient community- and country-bound health policy
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cannot be designed without adequate information on household healthcare expenditure,
especially for middle- and low-income countries.
Andersen (2016) showed that the presence of illness is the most obvious factor
that determines households’ OOP healthcare spending, while need is a perceived
phenomenon. Barros (1998); Di Matteo and Di Matteo (1998); Roberts (2000); Karatzas
(2000); Giannoni and Hitiris (2002); Clemente, Marcuiello, Montanes, and Pueyo (2004);
Herwartz and Theilen (2003); Koening et al. (2003); Di Matteo (2005); Crivelli,
Filippini, and Mosca (2006); Mosca (2007); You and Kobayashi (2011); Foster (2016);
and Molla, Chi, and Mondaca (2017) used income as one of the most important
determinants of healthcare expenditure.
There is little agreement regarding the value of the income elasticity of demand
for healthcare services. Getzen (2000) showed that this elasticity varies according to the
level of analysis (individual, regional, or aggregate) of the research.
Newhouse (1977); Leu (1986); Brown (1987); Parkin, McGuire, and Yule (1987);
and Gerdtham, Sogaard, Andersson, and Jonsson (1992) found that healthcare
expenditure in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
countries at the aggregate level before 1998 obtained values for income elasticity greater
than 1. Roberts (2000); Rous and Hotchkiss (2003); and Clemente et al. (2004) also
determined an income elasticity greater than unity. But Di Matteo and Di Matteo (1998);
Barros (1998); Karatzas (2000); Giannoni and Hitiris (2002); Koening et al. (2003);
Herwartz and Theilen (2003); Okunade (2005); Di Matteo (2005); and Molla et al. (2017)
identified an income elasticity with values between 0 and 1.
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Di Matteo and Di Matteo (1998); Karatzas (2000); Roberts (2000); Giannoni and
Hitiris (2002); Di Matteo (2005); Crivelli et al. (2006); You and Kobayashi (2011); Molla
et al. (2017); and Mahumud et al. (2017) found that people spend more on healthcare
with increasing age.
Gertler and Gaag (1990) showed that income, prices, and travel time are the main
determinants of healthcare expenditure. You and Kobayashi (2011) also identified that
healthcare expenditure increases with chronic disease and residence in urban areas.
Jochmann (2004) treated the number of doctor visits in the last 3 months as the
dependent variable, whereas the independent variables consisted of socioeconomic
characteristics and variables that described the health condition of the individual. They
included a self-perceived health satisfaction index, degree of handicap in percentage
points, relationship status, age, education, as well as variables measuring disability. They
found that the number of doctor visits increases with age until the age of 85 and decreases
thereafter.
Some studies have been conducted in developing countries using cross-sectional
data to identify determinants of healthcare expenditure.
Sodani (1999) considered “healthcare expenditure” as the dependent variable in
his paper on the tribal households of three selected districts of Rajasthan, India. The
explanatory variables were “duration of illness episode,” “number of visits to source of
care,” and “distance of source of care from the residence of households”. Howlader,
Routh, Hossain, Saha, and Khuda (2000) found that the amount of healthcare expenditure
varies with change in income, type of disease, and type of provider and estimated the
elasticities of demand for healthcare using cross-sectional data that were collected using a
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structured questionnaire administered to rural household heads in Bangladesh in 1997.
Rous and Hotchkiss (2003) used the Nepal Living Standards Survey, a nationally
representative sample of households from 1996, to investigate the determinants of
household OOP health expenditures. Okunade (2005) presented econometric model
findings of the determinants of per-capita health expenditure (at PPP) for 26 African
countries using 1995 cross-sectional data. They found that economic and other
determinants - per-capita GDP (at PPP), ODA (US$), Gini income inequality index,
population dependency ratio, internal conflicts, and the percentage of births attended by
trained medical workers - capture 74 percent of the variations in health expenditures.
Hague and Barman (2010) used household data from Chittagong Division to research the
factors of healthcare expenditure and showed that income has a significant effect on
people’s choice of healthcare provider and on their amount of healthcare spending.
Chang and Hague (2014) showed that illness, educational level, type of medical
consultants, household characteristics, location, and wealth significantly affect the level
of healthcare spending. Mahumud et al. (2017) and Molla et al. (2017) estimated the
predictors of health expenditure among Bangladeshi households using the Bangladesh
Household Income and Expenditure Survey (BHIES) 2010. Mahumud et al. (2017) used
age, marital status, education level, wealth quintile, sex, and first symptoms of illness as
the predictors of healthcare expenditure. Molla et al. (2017) presented that household
healthcare expenditure is determined by income, presence of health shock, presence of
chronic illness, proportion of illiterate members in the family, household durable goods,
family size, proportion of female members, and rural residence.
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The studies conducted in these countries have some limitations. These studies
mainly either used national data or were conducted in pocket areas that do not represent
any specific community (like the working-class population). Moreover, to show a causal
relationship, a limited number of studies have used modern econometric techniques of
analysis. Specification is essential for the formulation of a health system financing policy
for a community. This study uses cross-sectional microdata on resource-constrained
households like RPs in Dhaka collected via a survey conducted in 2014.
Sufficient knowledge about the extent, determinants, and elasticities of healthcare
expenditure is necessary to devise strategies to increase the allocative efficiency of
resources, ensure the proper utilization of the existing resources, and improve the quality
of services. Analysis of healthcare expenditure is also decisive in designing strategies
aimed at achieving financial sustainability for a program. The findings of the study will
be helpful in designing and executing a healthcare financing policy for households in a
working-class community.
3.3 Data and Methodology
3.3.1 Data
The study is based on a sample of 120 RPs. At the time of the survey, all of them
were living and working in Dhaka. A stratified sample was drawn at random from
different points of the city,7 ensuring the inclusion of all age groups. Selected RPs were
interviewed using a more detailed structure. Respondents were asked about healthcare
expenditures and various aspects of healthcare received in 2013 by all the RPs’

7

City points covered are Khilgoan (Mouchak, Modhubug, Malibug), Lalbug (Puran Dhaka, BDR 1 No.
Gate, Beribad), Mohammadpur (Adabor, Gigatola), Jattrabari, Mirpur, and Dhanmondi areas.
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household members. Data were collected from RP households who could choose from
public and private providers. They usually went to low- and medium-quality registered
private providers. Data on household annual income were also collected. Some
information on other costs involved in receiving healthcare were available, but not in the
required form. Though data on travel cost were available, data on travel time and waiting
time were not available. Data on age of the RP, years of schooling, marital status, and
distance of residence from the healthcare center and the duration of their household
members’ illness episodes were collected. RPs were the main or only earning member of
their households. RPs were also the household heads.
3.3.2 Empirical Regression Model Specification
Most of the studies on determinants of OOP healthcare expenditure in developing
countries have used ordinary least square (OLS) methods as econometric techniques.
Malik and Syed (2012) used the Household Integrated Economic Survey (HIES) and the
Pakistan Standard of Living Measurement (PSLM) Survey for the years 2004–05 to find
socioeconomic determinants of household OOP payments for healthcare in Pakistan.
Vasudeva and Okunade (2009) applied OLS and robust least absolute error (LAE)
estimation methods to estimate the core determinants of health expenditure using data
from 44 African countries for the year 2001. Molla et al. (2017) and Mahumud et al.
(2017) also applied OLS to estimate the predictors of health expenditure among
Bangladeshi households using the Bangladesh Household Income and Expenditure
Survey (BHIES) 2010. Mosca (2007) formulated a log-log in which he estimated the total
healthcare expenditure per capita (THE) by OLS with a sample of 20 countries in the
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OECD for which sufficient information was available from 1990–2000. Hague and
Barman (2010) attempted to find out the determinants of household healthcare
expenditure using a multi-equation recursive estimation procedure. First, they used a
binary logit model to estimate the probability of being ill, which was then used as an
independent variable in the second stage logit model for provider choice. Ordinary least
squares (OLS) estimates were obtained for the parameters of the healthcare expenditure
model in the third stage. Mugisha, Kouyata, Gbangou, and Sauerborn (2002) used a Tobit
model to examine OOP expenditure on healthcare in Nouna, Burkina Faso. However,
Rous and Hotchkiss (2003) recommended that a Tobit model should be applied carefully
in the case of health expenditure. They developed a full information maximum likelihood
model to control the endogeneity of sickness and provider choice using data from Nepal.
Hjortsberg (2003) used data from Zambia and validated the method to control
endogeneity bias by generating a selection term as a regressor in OLS estimation of
healthcare expenditure for corresponding providers.
I am going to use a Box-Cox transformation model (Box & Cox, 1964) to identify
the determinants of healthcare expenditure for a resource-constrained community using
cross-sectional microdata. The Box-Cox transformation model has been applied in
various economic applications. Examples include price changes (Millon, Gressel, &
Mulkey, 1984), demand and supply elasticities (Bessler et al., 1984), money demand
(Boylan & O’Muircheartaigh, 1981; Mills, 1978; Spitzer, 1976; White, 1972; Zarembka,
1968), hedonic price models (Blackley, Follain, & Ondrich, 1984; Megbolugbe, 1986),
exports (Davison, Arnade, & Hallahan, 1989; Miner, 1982), and import demand
(Blaylock & Smallwood, 1985; Boylan, Cuddy, & O’Muircheartaigh, 1980, 1982;
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Hwang, 1981; Khan & Ross, 1977); other examples include Granger and Newbold
(1976), Hopwood, McKeown, and Newbold (1984), Smyth and Dua (1986), Guerrero
(1987), and Montmarquette and Blais (1987).
Box-Cox transformation models are useful for minimizing functional form bias,
since the commonly assumed linear and log-log forms in expenditure models are nested
in the generalized flexible power family of the transformation model. Gerdtham, Sogaard,
Jonsson, and Andersson (1991) used this method in their OECD health expenditure
model, choosing the quadratic square root transformation as the best. Okunade (1985)
earlier tested a different set of functional forms - linear, linear-log, log-linear, and log-log
for selecting the best-fitting model for the 1960–72 data of each African country.
Gbesemete and Gerdtham (1992) selected a log-log model based on the RESET model
selection criterion rather than the Box-Cox power tests using 1984 data from Africa.
Okunade (2005) showed the results of the determinants of per-capita health expenditure
for 26 African countries using 1995 cross-sectional data and flexible Box-Cox model
regression methods.
The multiple regression model, specifying values of the dependent variable h to
depend on values of a set of regressors m, takes the general form
h = f (m, γ )

(3.1)

where the data column vector hi (i = 1, 2, . . ., k) ∈ matrix m (with a column of 1s for the
intercept), each mi is orthogonal to the other mi s (data columns of the regressors making
up the design matrix), and the model residuals ε are normally distributed with 0 means
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and a finite variance σ2. The regression parameter estimates of γi (∈ vector γ) captures the
𝜕ℎ

slope 𝜕𝑚 .
𝑖

Health expenditure data are typically not normally distributed (Tuckman, Chang,
& Okunade, 1999), and cross-sectional data model residuals are usually not
homoscedastic. Consequently, as in Carroll and Ruppert (1988), healthcare expenditure
data in this study can be optimally modeled by either assuming that h (skewed response
data) is capable of transformation to symmetry using the generalized flexible Box-Cox
power family of data transformations model or by specifying ε, the density of the model
residuals, as belonging to a class of skewed densities. The first method produces
maximum likelihood estimates (MLEs) of the regression model gradients (γ in equation
(3.1)) conditional on standard deviation (σ) and scalar power estimates (λ) that are
generally consistent with the observed dataset. On the other hand, the second approach is
a generalized linear model (GLM). I discuss the first estimation method here.
The generalized flexible, or fully flexible, fairly parametrically rich Box-Cox
transformation model (BCTM) is as follows in case of our healthcare expenditure
analysis:
ℎ𝜆 =

ℎ𝜆 −1

(3.2)

𝜆

where h is the total healthcare expenditure and λ is a scalar parameter that is jointly
estimated with other parameters of the regression model. The transformation could make
the residuals more closely normal and less heteroskedastic (Box & Cox, 1964). The
transform embeds several functional forms (Cook & Weisberg, 1982) admitting
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transformation of strictly positive data values for a continuous variable h, which takes the
form
h(λ) = h – 1 if λ = 1
if λ = 0

ln(h)
1–

1
ℎ

(3.3)

if λ = -1

The power family of the transformation model, also skew-correcting for the
dependent variable h, will be applied to the left- and right-hand-side variables (excluding
the dummy variable), to permit different λ power transformations of each variable in the
healthcare expenditure model. I can fit the following Box-Cox models for our healthcare
expenditure study and obtain the maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters for
different models (Drukker, 2000).
Theta model
hj(θ) = γ0

+

γ1 m(λ)1j + γ2 m(λ)2j

+...+

γk m(λ)kj + α1 n1j

+

α2 n2j + . . . + αl nlj

+

εj

(3.4)

where ε ~ N (0, σ2). Here, the dependent variable, h, is subject to a Box-Cox
transformation with the parameter θ. Each of the independent variables, m1, m2, . . ., mk,
is transformed by a Box-Cox transform with parameter λ. The independent variables
(e.g., dummy variables), n1, n2, . . ., nl, are not transformed.
Lambda model
hj(λ) = γ0

+

γ1 m(λ)1j + γ2 m(λ)2j

+...+

γk m(λ)kj + α1 n1j

+

α2 n2j + . . . + αl nlj

+

εj

(3.5)

where ε ~ N (0, σ2). Here, the dependent variable, h, and each of the independent
variables, m1, m2, . . ., mk, are transformed by a Box-Cox transformation with the
common parameter λ. The independent variables (e.g., dummy variables), n1, n2, . . ., nl,
are not transformed.
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Left-hand-side–only model
hj(λ) = γ0

+

γ1 m1j + γ2 m2j

+...+

γk mkj + εj

(3.6)

where ε ~ N (0, σ2). Here, the dependent variable, h, is subject to a Box-Cox
transformation with the parameter λ.
Right-hand-side–only model
hj = γ0

+

γ1 m(λ)1j + γ2 m(λ)2j

+...+

γk m(λ)kj + α1 n1j

+

α2 n2j + . . . + αl nlj

+

εj

(3.7)

where ε ~ N (0, σ2). Each of the independent variables, m1, m2, . . ., mk, is transformed by
a Box-Cox transformation with parameter λ. The independent variables (e.g., dummy
variables), n1, n2, . . ., nl, are not transformed.
Estimation of likelihood function for different models
In the internal computations,
ℎ𝜆 =

ℎ𝜆 −1
𝜆

for all λ >0

ln(h) otherwise
The unconcentrated log likelihood for the theta model is
𝐼

1

ln L = (- 2 ) ln { (2𝜋) + ln(𝜎 2 )} + (𝜃 − 1) ∑𝐼𝑖=1 ln(ℎ𝑖) − (2𝜎2 ) SSR
where SSR = sum of squared residuals
= ∑

𝐼

(ℎ

𝑖=1

(𝜃)

− 𝛾0 +

(𝜆)
𝛾1 𝑚𝑖1

+

(𝜆)
𝛾2 𝑚𝑖2

+ ⋯+

(𝜆)
𝛾𝑘 𝑚𝑗𝑘

2

+ 𝛼1 𝑛𝑖1 + 𝛾𝛼2 𝑛𝑖2 + ⋯ + 𝛼𝑙 𝑛𝑗𝑙 )

Writing the SSR in matrix form,
SSR = ( h(θ) - M(λ)d′ - Nq′ )′ ( h(θ) - M(λ)d′ - Nq′ )
where h(θ) is an I × 1 vector of elementwise transformed data, M(λ) is an I × k matrix of
elementwise transformed data, N is an I × l matrix of untransformed data, d is a 1 × k
vector of coefficients, and q is a 1 × l vector of coefficients.
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Let
Zλ = ( M(λ) N )
be the horizontal concatenation of M(λ) and N and
𝑑′
𝑣′ = ( )
𝑞′
be the vertical concatenation of the coefficients’ yields
SSR = ( h(θ) - Zλ v′ )′ ( h(θ) - Zλ v′ )
For given values of λ and θ, the solutions for v′ and 𝜎 2 are
v*′ = ( Z′λZλ)-1 Z′λh(θ)
and
𝐼

𝜎 ∗2 = ( 2) ( h(θ) - Zλ v*′ )′ ( h(θ) - Zλ v*′ )
Substituting these solutions into the log-likelihood function yields the concentrated loglikelihood function:
𝐼

ln Lc = (- ) ln { (2𝜋) + 1 + ln(𝜎 ∗2 )} + (𝜃 − 1) ∑𝐼𝑖=1 ln(ℎ𝑖)
2

Similar calculations yield the concentrated log-likelihood function for the lambda model:
𝐼

ln Lc = (- 2 ) ln { (2𝜋) + 1 + ln(𝜎 ∗2 )} + (𝜆 − 1) ∑𝐼𝑖=1 ln(ℎ𝑖)
For the left-hand-side–only model:
𝐼

ln Lc = (- 2 ) ln { (2𝜋) + 1 + ln(𝜎 ∗2 )} + (𝜃 − 1) ∑𝐼𝑖=1 ln(ℎ𝑖)
For the right-side–only model:
𝐼

ln Lc = (- 2 ) ln { (2𝜋) + 1 + ln(𝜎 ∗2 )}
where 𝜎 ∗2 is specific to each model and is defined analogously to that in the theta model.
The chi-square (χ2) likelihood ratio test statistic, applied to the log-likelihood
function values of the BCTM versus each of the restricted regression models, is used to
guide selection of the optimal functional form from among the parametrically more
restrictive competing models (linear-linear, linear-log, log-linear, log-log) that are nested
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in my more general BCTM specification. The research goal of the BCTM model is to fit
the appropriate functional form model to the observed data in order to reduce the
specification bias that could arise from the fitting the a priori restrictive functional form
models.
The expected relationship of each determinant to healthcare expenditure (HCEX)
in a BCTM regression model estimation of the type ℎ(𝜆0) = 𝑚(𝜆1) γ + ε, where γ is the
slope vector, h is HCEX, m is matrix of independent variables, and ε is the residual
vector, is as follows:
(HCEX)(𝜆) = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1 (LINC)(𝜆1) + 𝛾2 (DIST)(𝜆2) + 𝛾3 (AGE)(𝜆3) + 𝛾4 (DOIE)(𝜆4)
+ 𝛾5 (FS)(𝜆5)+ 𝛾6 (YSHH)(𝜆6) + 𝛼1 (MSHH) + ε
where, in accordance with a priori theoretical expectations,
𝛾1, 𝛾2, 𝛾3, 𝛾4, 𝛾5, 𝛾6, 𝛼1 > 0.
The dependent variable:
HCEX = healthcare expenditure of household
Explanatory variables:
LINC = annual income (last-year income)
DIST = distance of residence from healthcare center/hospital
AGE = age of household head
DOIE = duration of illness episode
FS = family size
YSHH = years of schooling of household head
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(3.8)

Dummy variable:
MSHH = marital status of household head, MSHH = 1 if married; MSHH = 0 if
unmarried
3.4 Descriptive Statistics
Table 3.1 shows that the mean age of household head (RP) was about 36 years.
The average number of years of schooling was about 3 years. Most of the sample RPs
were married (85 percent). Only about 22 percent of RPs owned their rickshaws, and the
rest of the RPs rented their rickshaws on a daily basis. The average number of family
members in an RP household was about 5. The number of income earners in each
household was about 2. The average annual income of RP households was $1,227 (BDT
95,406). An RP held $1,826 (BDT 141,968) in wealth on an average. The mean savings
of an RP household was $54 (BDT 4,228). Average debt was $63 (BDT 4,892). The
average net savings was $-5.50 (BDT -664). The average RP household was sick 47 days
in the last year. The mean number of days the household members stayed in the hospital
was 5, and they were absent from work about 24 days in the last year. They lost about
$158 (BDT 122.79) in the last year due to illness. About 87 percent of RP households
receive modern healthcare (registered physician and modern medical facilities). The
mean number of visits to the health center was about 7. The average distance from the
healthcare center was 2.63 kilometers. The user fee per visit was $0.90 (BDT 70). The
travel cost per visit was $0.38 (BDT 30). Medicine cost per visit was $5 (BDT 397).
About 74 percent of RP households were satisfied with the quality of healthcare, and 65
percent of the RP households were pleased with the health service they received from the
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healthcare center. About 84 percent of them were willing to pay for healthcare when they
became ill. About 85 percent of them took addictive substances, on which they spent
about $0.30 (BDT 23) each day. Average expenditure for total healthcare in an RP
household was $70 (BDT 5,408). The per capita total expenditure for healthcare last year
was $14.84 (BDT 1146). The share of household budget spent on healthcare was 5.70
percent. Please visit the appendix (Tables A 3.1–A 3.8) for the distribution of different
variables.
3.5 Results
I discussed four different Box-Cox models in section 3. Table 3.2 presents a BoxCox model estimates based on prior studies (Bessler et al., 1984; Blackley et al., 1984;
Blaylock & Smallwood, 1985; Boylan & O’Muircheartaigh, 1981; Boylan et al., 1980,
1982; Davison et al., 1989; Gerdtham et al., 1991; Granger & Newbold, 1976; Guerrero,
1987; Hopwood et al., 1984; Hwang, 1981; Khan & Ross, 1977; Megbolugbe, 1986;
Millon et al., 1984; Mills, 1978; Miner, 1982; Montmarquette & Blais, 1987; Okunade,
2005; Smyth & Dua, 1986; Spitzer, 1976; White, 1972; Zarembka, 1968). I used the
lambda model in my analysis to explain the determinants of healthcare expenditure of a
resource-constrained community. Regression estimates used OOP healthcare expenditure
as the dependent variable. The p-values are in parentheses.
Results of the lambda model are presented in Column I of Table 3.2. I found the
signs of the coefficients as expected except age of the household head. The coefficients
of annual income and age of the household head are significant at the 10 percent level.
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The duration of illness episode is significant at the 1 percent level, and the distance of the
residence from the healthcare center/hospital is significant at the 11 percent level.
The income elasticity of healthcare is 0.547 and significant, implying that
healthcare is a normal and necessary good for the resource-constrained community of
rickshaw pullers. It shows that a 10 percent increase in income level leads to a 5.4 percent
increase in household healthcare expenditure. This result is supported by Di Matteo and
Di Matteo (1998); Barros (1998); Karatzas (2000); Giannoni and Hitiris (2002); Koening
et al. (2003); Herwartz and Theilen (2003); Okunade (2005); Di Matteo (2005); and
Molla et al. (2017). They found income elasticity for healthcare, with values between 0
and 1. Rickshaw pulling is a laborious occupation that requires physical fitness. If RPs
become sick, they do not have any other means of earning. This gives rickshaw pullers
the motivation to visit doctors when sick.
The coefficient of the distance of the household’s residence from the healthcare
center/hospital shows that a 10 percent increase in distance leads to a 7.6 percent increase
in household healthcare expenditure. Sodani (1999) also showed that “distance of source
of care from” can explain the healthcare expenditure increase in the rural and urban areas
of three districts of Rajasthan, India.
The age coefficient shows that healthcare expenditure is inversely associated with
age, and a 10 percent increase in an RP’s age leads to a 24.5 percent decrease in
household healthcare expenditure. This is supported by Begum and Sen (2004). They
explained that driving a rickshaw on a regular basis is hard work, and after the age of 50,
it is difficult to drive throughout the entire week, so drivers tended to drive 3 to 4 days a
week, which may cause a decrease in their daily income. This drop in income causes a

79

decrease in their healthcare expenditure, since the number of dependents in a household
increases as the head grows older, requiring him to redistribute his healthcare expenditure
toward food and other consumption items. However, Di Matteo and Di Matteo (1998);
Karatzas (2000); Roberts (2000); Giannoni and Hitiris (2002); Di Matteo (2005); Crivelli
et al. (2006); You and Kobayashi (2011); Molla et al. (2017); and Mahumud et al. (2017)
observed that people spent more on healthcare with increasing age. This implies that the
healthcare expenditure is inversely associated with age of the household head in a
resource-constrained community and positively associated for others.
The coefficient of duration of illness episode shows that OOP healthcare
expenditure is positively associated with the number of sick days of the household
members, and a 10 percent increase in duration of illness leads to a 12.6 percent increase
in expenditure on health. Sodani (1999) also found a similar direction of the coefficient.
The coefficient of years of schooling of the household head implies that a
household head with a greater number of schooling years spends more on healthcare for
his household than a household head with fewer schooling years, holding all other
variables constant. The RPs with less education either chose alternative or home remedies
or were not as well informed about the accessibility of healthcare. Jochmann and LeonGonzalez (2004); Hague and Barman (2010); Chang and Hague (2014); Mahumud et al.
(2017); and Molla et al. (2017) also observed a similar direction of the coefficient.
Moreover, the RPs were born and raised in poor families and must start earning from
their childhood or help parents in their household activities instead of going to school.
The RPs had on average fewer than 3 years of schooling (Table 3.1). Therefore, level of
education affected their healthcare expenditure, but not significantly. However, these
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findings have been checked with other regression equations and observed to be in the
same direction of the coefficient.
Like Molla et al. (2017), I also find that there is a positive association between
healthcare expenditure and the size of a family. The result shows that a 10 percent
increase in number of family members leads to a 13.6 percent increase in household
healthcare expenditure.
The result shows that households with married household heads (RPs) spent more
on healthcare than households with unmarried RPs, holding all other variables
unchanged. Mahumud et al. (2017) supports this finding.
The robustness results of the lambda model are presented in Table 3.3. Column
VII of Table 3.3 shows that a 10 percent increase in number of the dependent family
members leads to an 11.5 percent decrease in healthcare expenditure. Okunade (2005)
observed the same direction of the coefficient for the variable dependency ratio in his
study. All the coefficients of the equations in Table 3.3 show the same direction of the
coefficient as in the previous study. Income, distance, age of the household head, and
duration of illness episode variables are significant in all the regression equations.
To compare the lambda model with other versions of the Box-Cox model, I report
the left-hand-side–only model and right-hand-side–only model in brief. I do not report
the other version of the Box-Cox model, the theta model.8 The results of the left-handside–only model and right-hand-side–only model are presented in Table 3.2. Column II
presents the results of the left-hand-side–only model. The result shows that healthcare
expenditure is inversely associated with the marital status of the household head. But
8

The theta model did not converge to have definite estimates.
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based on the prior study, I expected that healthcare expenditure would be positively
related to marital status. The value of the income coefficient is too small to explain. No
other coefficient is significant in this model. Column III shows the results of right-handside–only model. I expected healthcare expenditure to have a positive association with
years of schooling. However, the result shows that they are inversely associated. Though
the coefficient of the age of household and the duration of illness episode are significant,
other explanatory variables are not statistically significant. The robustness tests of the
left-hand-side–only model and right-hand-side–only model are presented in Tables 3.4
and 3.5, respectively.
3.6 Summary, Conclusions, and Implications
This study examined a Box-Cox econometric model of the determinants of health
expenditure in a resource-constrained community using cross-sectional microdata on
rickshaw pullers, who represent the working-class population.
The results of the study show that annual household income, distance of residence
from a healthcare center/hospital, age of the household head, duration of illness episode,
years of schooling, family size, and marital status are the main factors of total healthcare
expenditure among resource-constrained households. I found that healthcare expenditure
is positively associated with household income level, distance of residence from
healthcare center/hospital, duration of illness episode, years of schooling of the
household head, family size, and marital status, as expected; these associations are
supported by previous studies. However, healthcare expenditure is inversely associated
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with age of the household head; this association in case of a resource-constrained
community is opposite of the existing literature.
The income elasticity of about 0.55 signals the tendency for healthcare to behave
like a normal and necessary good. Since healthcare is a necessity in the “basic needs”
theory of economic development, the way healthcare expenditure in a resourceconstrained community responds to changes in income level and other factors is
particularly relevant to development policy. Working-class populations in developing
countries have unmet healthcare needs, and effective policies and programs are needed to
ensure that healthcare services are received in a timely manner.
The distance of a household’s residence from the healthcare center/hospital and
the duration of an illness episode also play significant roles in determining healthcare
expenditure. The results show that a 10 percent increase in the distance leads to a 7.6
percent increase in household healthcare expenditure, and a 10 percent increase in
duration of illness leads to a 12.6 percent increase in expenditure on health. Moreover, a
10 percent increase in the number of family members leads to a 13.6 percent increase in
household healthcare expenditure.
The finding shows that healthcare expenditure is inversely associated with the age
of the household head. It may happen in a resource-constrained community because the
earning ability (income level) of day laborers decreases as their age increases. The
situation is aggravated when the household head has an accident or experiences severe
sickness. Moreover, the number of dependents in the household increases as the head
becomes older, requiring redistribution of healthcare expenses toward food and other
consumption items.
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This study can help policymakers design extensive and effective financial
protection mechanisms for the resource-constrained community by finding the predictors
of healthcare expenditure. Though the current study shows that healthcare is a necessary
good, OOP payments are not an equitable or efficient financing mechanism. Resourceconstrained, hardworking poor citizens do not receive the high-quality healthcare services
they need, and their standard of living is less than that of other city dwellers. Extensive
safety net programs need to be designed and implemented for resource-constrained
communities. The quality of healthcare received by this group of households and its
availability should be ensured. Precise policy and management improvements in pursuit
of better quality and more equitable distribution of resources in the health sector must be
undertaken to provide health services to this group of population. Universal healthcare
coverage for this group of households should be guaranteed. Governments of different
countries need to reinforce existing healthcare programs, and additionally, they should
introduce effective new types of safety net for the working-class population in old age,
especially if the households have no other earning member. Policymakers can spread
their family planning/birth control services more effectively to the doors of such
communities to keep the family size small. A specialized bank for the resourceconstrained community can be introduced to provide small and medium enterprise loans
with low interest rates and insurance policies to cover the loss of injury (Bose, 2014). As
per Molla et al. (2017), alternative revenue generation and allocation of resources to
cover the health needs of resource-constrained households need to be revisited. For
instance, exempting this group of households from fees could reduce their OOP
healthcare expenditure and financial burden. This study advocates that countries need to
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reform their health system financing structures so that the resource-constrained
community can meet their unmet healthcare needs.
In future research, the sample size might be increased to derive the healthcare
expenditure function for a larger population. The survey could not be conducted widely
because of some limitations (e.g., financial and time constraints). On occasion, the
respondents did not assist adequately. Moreover, conducting interviews involved several
safety concerns during evening hours when RPs were available at home. There is a scope
to conduct extensive research by increasing the sample size of the RPs covering the
whole of Bangladesh and other countries so that effective policy measures may be taken
to improve the health status of a marginalized, poor segment of society. In addition,
future research on health spending among the working-class population might consider
other resource-constrained communities with different occupations.

85

TABLES
Table 3. 1 Descriptive Statistics for Core Sample.
USD($)9

Variable

Mean (BDT)

N

Age of RP

36.358 (11.349)

120

Years of schooling of RP

2.967 (2.719)

120

Marital status

0.850 (0.358)

120

Ownership of rickshaw

0.217 (0.413)

120

Number of family members of RP

4.717 (1.557)

120

Number of income earners in RP’s

1.717 (0.842)

120

household
Household annual income

95,406.5 (43,974.67)

1,227

120

Per capita income (household annual

20,226.10

260.12

120

Household wealth

141,968.3 (388745.9)

1,826

120

Household savings

4,228.042 (11100.14)

54

120

Household debt

4,891.667 (10148.31)

63

120

Household net savings

-663.625 (14769.63)

- 5.5

120

Household sick days last year

46.792 (89.194)

120

Number of days stayed in hospital

4.908 (13.074)

120

Number of days absent from work due to

23.858 (38.375)

120

income/ average number of family
members of RP)

illness
Income lost due to last year illness

12,279.5 (51,008.7)

Received modern healthcare

0.867 (0.341)

158

120
120

Note: Standard deviations indicated in parentheses.

9

Considering the exchange rate $1 = BDT 77.75 as of December 30, 2013, available on the website of
Bangladesh Bank (2013), Central Bank of Bangladesh, https://www.bb.org.bd/econdata/exchangerate.php.
BDT is the code for the Bangladeshi currency, the Taka.
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Table 3.1 Continued
USD($)10

Variable

Mean (BDT)

N

Number of visits to healthcare center last

7.025 (9.585)

120

2.630 (3.948)

120

year
Distance from healthcare
center/hospital(km)
User fee per visit

69.842 (90.555)

0.90

120

Travel cost per visit

29.892 (41.796)

0.38

120

Medicine cost per visit

396.667 (861.474)

5

120

Quality of healthcare if satisfactory

0.742 (0.440)

120

Quality of health service if satisfactory

0.650 (0.479)

120

Willingness to pay for healthcare

0.842 (0.366)

120

Whether any family member takes

0.85 (0.358)

120

addictive substances
Money spent on addiction per day

22.925 (21.127)

0.30

120

Total expenditure for healthcare last year

5,407.842 (24787.59)

70

120

Per capita total expenditure for healthcare

1,146.46

14.84

120

5.70 %

120

last year* (total expenditure for healthcare
last year/ average number of family
members of RP)
Share of household budget spent on
healthcare (total expenditure for healthcare
last year /household annual income)
Note: Standard deviations indicated in parentheses. *The World Bank (2016) defines “extreme poverty” as
living on less than $1.90 per person per day. Based on this information, the annual income of an extremely
poor person is less than $693.50 (= $1.90*365), so a rickshaw puller’s household falls into this category.

10

Considering the exchange rate $1 = BDT 77.75 as of December 30, 2013, available on the website of
Bangladesh Bank (2013), Central Bank of Bangladesh, https://www.bb.org.bd/econdata/exchangerate.php.
BDT is the code for the Bangladeshi currency, the Taka.
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Table 3. 2 Box-Cox Regression Estimates of the Out-of-Pocket Healthcare Expenditure
Model (λ* ≅ 0)
Dependent variable: Healthcare expenditure
Box-Cox regression
(I)
Different Box-Cox models Lambda model
Household’s annual
income

0.547*
(0.060)

Estimator
(II)
Left-hand-side–
only model
0.0000*
(0.054)

Distance of residence from
healthcare center/hospital

0.758
(0.119)

0.195
(0.159)

2,479
(0.297)

Age of household head

-2.454*
(0.072)

-0.068
(0.260)

-1,316*
(0.098)

Duration of illness episode

1.258***
(0.000)

0.019***
(0.003)

2,445**
(0.062)

Years of schooling of
household head

0.135
(0.803)

0.102
(0.609)

1,304
(0.616)

Family size

1.360
(0.335)

0.211
(0.596)

9,981
(0.154)

Marital status

0.563
(0.763)

-0.927
(0.624)

11,705
(0.163)

N

120

120

120

Note: p-values in parentheses. ***p < 0.01. **p < 0.05. *p < 0.1.
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(III)
Right-hand-side–
only model
1,912
(0.526)

Table 3. 3 Box-Cox Regression Estimates of the Out-of-Pocket Healthcare Expenditure Model
(lambda model) (λ* ≅ 0)
Dependent variable: Healthcare expenditure
Box-Cox regression
Lambda model
Independent
(I)
(II)
(III)
variables
Household’s
annual income

0.718**
(0.023)

Distance of
residence from
healthcare
center/hospital

(IV)

(V)

Estimator
(VI)

(VII)

0.714**
(0.028)

0.714**
(0.027)

0.606**
(0.030)

0.605**
(0.030)

0.531*
(0.064)

0.468
(0.144)

1.060**
(0.046)

1.032**
(0.049)

0.743
(0.125)

0.743
(0.125)

0.750
(0.123)

0.724
(0.137)

-1.381
(0.215)

-1.967*
(0.053)

-1.955*
(0.057)

-2.196**
(0.038)

-2.601*
(0.060)

1.264***
(0.000)

1.263***
(0.000)

1.249***
(0.000)

1.265***
(0.000)

0.043
(0.936)

0.110
(0.837)

0.103
(0.849)

1.202
(0.358)

2.874
(0.312)

Age of
household head
Duration of
illness episode
Years of
schooling of
household head
Family size

Marital status

0.933
(0.633)

Number of
dependents in
the household11

-1.146
(0.538)

N

120

120

120

120

120

120

120

Note: p-values in parentheses. ***p < 0.01. **p < 0.05. *p < 0.1.

11

The number of dependents in the household is equal to the family size minus the number of earning
members in the household.
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Table 3. 4 Box-Cox Regression Estimates of the Out-of-Pocket Healthcare Expenditure Model
(left-hand-side–only model) (λ* ≅ 0)
Dependent variable: Healthcare expenditure
Box-Cox regression
Left-hand-side–only model
Independent
(I)
(II)
(III)
(IV)
variables
Household’s
0.000** 0.000**
0.000**
0.000**
annual income (0.014) (0.019)
(0.021)
(0.016)
0.274**
(0.043)

Distance of
resident from
healthcare
center/hospital
Age of
household head

(V)

Estimator
(VI)
(VII)

0.000**
(0.017)

0.000**
(0.040)

0.00*
(0.089)

0.278**
(0.039)

0.187
(0.173)

0.193
(0.163)

0.194
(0.161)

0.196
(0.163)

-0.045
(0.327)

-0.077
(0.103)

-0.075
(0.118)

-0.085*
(0.088)

-0.068
(0.266)

0.019***
(0.002)

0.019***
(0.002)

0.019***
(0.002)

0.019***
(0.003)

0.088
(0.652)

0.113
(0.570)

0.102
(0.609)

0.279
(0.455)

0.192
(0.820)

Duration of
illness episode
Years of
schooling of
household head
Family size

Marital status

-0.939
(0.629)

Number of
dependents in
the household12
N

0.022
(0.980)
120

120

120

120

120

120

120

Note: p-values in parentheses. ***p < 0.01. **p < 0.05. *p < 0.1.

12

The number of dependents in the household is equal to the family size minus the number of earning
members in the household.

90

Table 3. 5 Box-Cox Regression Estimates of the Out-of-Pocket Healthcare Expenditure Model
(right-hand-side–only model) (λ* ≅ 0)
Dependent variable: Healthcare expenditure
Box-Cox regression
Right-hand-side–only model
Independent
(I)
(II)
(III)
(IV)
variables
Household’s
116,275 17,347 17,044
2,054
annual income (0.773)
(0.447) (0.448)
(0.520)
Distance of
resident from
healthcare
center/hospital

3,152
(0.235)

Age of
household head

(V)

Estimator
(VI)
(VII)

2,521
(0.507)

1,398
(0.702)

1,433
(0.403)

3,093
(0.244)

2,264
(0.343)

2,346
(0.334)

2,333
(0.334)

2,419
(0.284)

-5,649
(0.614)

-4,088
(0.506)

-5,113
(0.435)

-6,547
(0.320)

-10,046
(0.124)

23,332*
(0.078)

2,506*
(0.071)

2,341*
(0.087)

2,027**
(0.063)

-2,266
(0.391)

-1,914
(0.469)

-1,067
(0.665)

6,501
(0.332)

1,831
(0.891)

Duration of
illness episode
Years of
schooling of
household head
Family size

Marital status

9,913
(0.124)

Number of
dependents in
the household13
N

5,511
(0.526)
120

120

120

120

120

120

120

Note: p-values in parentheses. ***p < 0.01. **p < 0.05. *p < 0.1.

13

The number of dependents in the household is equal to the family size minus the number of earning
members in the household.

91

APPENDIX
The distribution of different variables was prepared by the author based on the
survey conducted by him. Here, Bangladeshi currency, the Taka (BDT), 14 is considered
for the calculation of income, savings, and wealth.
Table A 3. 1 Household Head Age Group Distribution
Parameters

Frequency

Percentage

16–25

20

17

26–35

45

37

36–45

31

26

46–55

17

14

> 55

7

6

Age group (years)

Source: Author’s calculation from the survey conducted by him.

Table A 3. 2 Distribution of Years of Schooling of Household Head
Parameters

Frequency

Percentage

0

13

11

1–3

62

52

4–6

30

24.5

7–9

9

8

10–12

6

4.5

Years of schooling

Source: Author’s calculation from the survey conducted by him.

14

Considering the exchange rate $1 = BDT 77.75 as of December 30, 2013, available on the website of
Bangladesh Bank (2013), Central Bank of Bangladesh, https://www.bb.org.bd/econdata/exchangerate.php.
BDT is the code for the Bangladeshi currency, the Taka.
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Table A 3. 3 Distribution of Average Monthly Income of Households
Parameters

Frequency

Percentage

≤5,000

26

22

5,001–7,000

27

22.5

7,001–9,000

30

25

9,001–11,000

15

12.5

11,001–13,000

10

8

>13,000

12

10

Source: Author’s calculation from the survey conducted by him.

Table A 3. 4 Distribution of Wealth Holding
Parameters

Frequency

Percentage

0

44

36.67

1–50,000

39

32.5

50,001–100,000

9

7.5

100,001–150,000

6

5

150,001–200,000

3

2.5

200,001–250,000

3

2.5

250,001–300,000

0

0

300,001–350,000

3

2.5

>350,000

13

10.83

Source: Author’s calculation from the survey conducted by him.
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Table A 3. 5 Distribution of Net Savings
Parameters

Frequency

Percentage

-50,000 to -20,000

8

6.67

-19,000 to -10,000

8

6.67

-9,999 to -1

18

15

0

47

39.2

1 to 10,000

29

24.2

10,001 to 20,000

4

3.33

>20,000

6

5

Source: Author’s calculation from the survey conducted by him.

Table A 3. 6 Distribution of Marital Status
Parameters

Frequency

Percentage

Married

94

78

Unmarried

26

22

Source: Author’s calculation from the survey conducted by him.
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Table A 3. 7 Distribution of Number of Sick Days of RP Households
Parameters

Frequency

Percentage

0

9

7.5

1–30

70

58.33

31–60

20

16.67

61–90

10

8.33

>90

11

9.17

Source: Author’s calculation from the survey conducted by him.

Table A 3. 8 Distribution of Number of Family Members of RP Households
Taking any Drug
Parameters

Frequency

Percentage

Not taking

19

15.83

Taking

101

84.17

Source: Author’s calculation from the survey conducted by him.
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